

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Presidents of United States and France Coordinate Views on Summit Conference

Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, President of the Community, made a state visit to the United States April 22-29. President de Gaulle, accompanied by Mme. de Gaulle and party, was in Washington from April 22 to 26 and then began a brief trip in the United States that included stops at New York City, San Francisco, and New Orleans. Following are texts of a joint communique released on April 25 and an address President de Gaulle made before a joint session of the Congress, together with an exchange of greetings with President Eisenhower at the Washington National Airport on April 22, an exchange of toasts at the state dinner at the White House that evening, and remarks made by Secretary Herter at a luncheon on April 25.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, APRIL 25

White House press release dated April 25

The President of the United States and the President of the French Republic have had a series of talks from April 22 to 25 on the occasion of the visit of General de Gaulle. The Secretary of State of the United States, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France and the Ambassadors of the two countries have taken part in these talks.

The exchanges of views which they have had have permitted them to define more precisely the positions which will be taken at the Summit Conference on the questions which will be raised there.

The main purpose of this Conference in the view of the two Presidents is to achieve an easing of tensions in the international situation.

ADDRESS BEFORE THE CONGRESS, APRIL 25¹

Unofficial translation

Mr. Speaker, the eloquent words you have just spoken, and for which I want to thank you, were inspired by the reason and sentiment which have at all times distinguished the relations between our two countries. Since the appearance of the United States on the world scene, we have fought side by side on three occasions and for three great causes. First, it was for your independence. Later on it was for the independence of others. Finally, it was for the independence of France herself. Our common past is filled with efforts and sacrifices. It is great because at all times we have served together for freedom. It is dear to us, so much so that in spite of vicissitudes the friendship between Americans and Frenchmen, though two centuries old, is today more alive than ever.

Under any circumstances, I would have come with joy to see my illustrious friend President Eisenhower, to bring to your Congress the very cordial salutations of the French Republic and to renew a direct contact with the American people.

I visited you in 1944, at a time when, under the leadership of Roosevelt, your decisive contribution to the war was to bring about the liberation of France and of Europe. I came back in 1945 on the morrow of the great victories won by the armies of the West, in Europe under the command of Dwight Eisenhower, in the Pacific under the orders of MacArthur, and while President Tru-

¹ *Congressional Record* of Apr. 25, 1960, p. 8034.

man was striving to build a peace both firm and just.

But from that time on, the world was destined to remain beset by troubles and dangers. My present trip is taking place on the eve of an international meeting where the fate of mankind may be oriented either toward calamity or toward peace. This explains the great importance which I attach to the conversations I have just had with the President and members of the administration and also to my meeting with you distinguished Senators and Congressmen at the Capitol in Washington.

Indeed, I do not believe that the human race has ever been more threatened than it is today. Mechanism now dominates the earth. It has brought forth gigantic material progress. But at the same time, it has produced two apparently irreconcilable systems, each of which claims it possesses the only workable way to transform society.

Moreover, the convulsions of two world wars have aroused in peoples, who number 2 billion, the will to liberate themselves from all foreign subjection and the passionate desire to reach the stage of development of the most advanced countries. Finally, there is no end to the accumulation and the perfecting of the means of nuclear destruction capable of annihilating life over vast spaces and the vehicles which can carry them anywhere. Given these elements which are bound with one another, the equilibrium of the world is no more than a cold war, a war that engenders fear, incites invectives and engulfs resources, and all problems appear insoluble and envenomed.

But, if in material terms the balance between the two camps which divide the universe may seem equal, morally it is not. France made her choice. She has chosen to be on the side of the free peoples; she has chosen to be there with you. Certainly in this decision what counts for much is the memory of what our alliance has been, the help given us under the Marshall plan after the last war to restore our economy, the threat that the Soviet bloc raises for us and for you and finally the colossal effort you are making so that, should the occasion arise, aggression brings death to the aggressor even if it must at the same time cause the death of the defender. But what has led France to your side and holds her there are her national spirit which is a 1,000 years old, her tra-

dition which made her a champion of freedom, her ideal which has for name the Rights of Man and her conviction that in the end order in the world calls for democracy on the national plane and the right of self-government on the international plane. And these are the very things which are also the vision, the inspiration and the spirit of the American people.

Nonetheless while France has chosen to belong altogether to the gathering of the free peoples, she does not despair at all of seeing peace established in the world.

Since all things have to have a beginning, she believes that only a detente is now possible and necessary. But this detente, who else can achieve it, but the nations who have been the creators and who remain the bearers of modern civilization? This means all Europe and America, her daughter. To be sure, the fate of the universe has at other times depended on peoples of other regions. It may happen that, in the future, such might become the case again. But, today, the destiny of our human race depends upon the states of the Old and the New World.

Let them be agreed and no one will ignore them. If this cannot happen then every point on the land, the sea and the sky will undoubtedly contain a virulent cause of conflict. Besides, is it inconceivable that the evolution taking place within each of the two social orders now in existence in the modern nations may progressively reduce their differences and their oppositions?

Until these nations have reached a true *modus vivendi* in their relations, however, any demand that might be made for the conclusion of treaties, the definition of borders, and the modification of statutes in the most sensitive regions, would be unfortunate and untimely, because it would jeopardize the better relations which we aim to establish. On the other hand in the peaceable climate which could be created, objective solutions would little by little come into view.

Everybody understands that, in bringing up such subjects, I am referring in the first place to those which relate to Germany. It is not my intention to deal with them in detail here. But I want to say that any attempt to aggravate the wounds suffered by the German people must be avoided. I will even add that Federal Germany is rendering the greatest possible service to coexistence by incorporating itself as it does into West-

ern Europe. Through the organization of a Western Europe ensemble, facing the bloc built by the Soviets, it will be possible to establish, from the Atlantic to the Urals, some equilibrium between those two zones which are comparable, both in populations and in resources. Alone such a balance may perhaps, one day, enable the old continent to bring a reconciliation between its two parts, to find peace within itself, to give a fresh start to its civilization and lastly to have the possibility, together with America, to help, in an atmosphere of serenity, the development of the unfavored masses of Asia and of the awakening populations of Africa.

Indeed, such aid, offered to the countries that lack everything, is, for those who do not lack anything, both the greatest human duty and the most fruitful policy. How much less the chances of war if the great modern States should choose as a common aim such an undertaking. What a sigh of relief would pass across the globe if, in this field, above their rivalries, these great States established practical cooperation were it only, to begin with, limited to a few matters.

But, whatever the men who bear the paramount responsibility in the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France may attempt in a near future toward improving relations between their countries, increasing human, economic, cultural exchanges as well as their cooperation for the development of certain Asiatic or African areas, peace and life will nevertheless be in jeopardy if the temptation and the threat of war remain hanging over the world due to nuclear weapons. To destroy these weapons by common consent, to enter the commitment not to manufacture any others, to open up all territories to reciprocal supervision, there is no other hope for the future of our species. One can indeed apply contractual measures first to the vehicles of death, missiles, planes, ships, which, even today, it is possible to prevent from carrying bombs and to supervise in common. It is precisely thus that France recommends that disarmament be started. But we have reached the last moment when an agreement appears possible. Failing the renunciation of atomic armaments by those states who are provided with them, the French Republic obviously will be obliged to equip itself with such armaments. In consequence, how many others will attempt to do the same? In the state of increas-

ing uncertainty in which fear throws the peoples of the world, the risk grows that, one day, events will escape from the control of those who obey reason and that the worst catastrophes will be unleashed by fanatics, lunatics or men of ambition.

Three weeks from now, Messrs. Eisenhower, Macmillan, Khrushchev and myself will compare our views after having done so two by two. I do not think that anyone believes that it will be enough that the four of us sit together for problems of such magnitude to be effectively solved. Perhaps we shall, at last, decide on the road to follow, however long and arduous the stages may be. In any event, my country has determined its purposes and its hopes.

Americans, let me say to you: in the big contest which lies ahead, nothing counts more for France than the wisdom, the resolution, the friendship of the great people of the United States. This is what I came here to tell you.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, APRIL 22¹

President Eisenhower

President de Gaulle, it is a very great pleasure for me and for the American people to welcome you here, sir, with Madame de Gaulle and members of your party.

There has been a long and very special relationship existing between the United States and France. We have shared 200 years of common experiences. We have been devoted to common ideals, and the men of our two countries have shared their blood in common cause.

Through all of these experiences and these adventures, the affection and the admiration of one people for another have never weakened—indeed they have strengthened. And it is a happy circumstance that your visit here today is symbolic of that continuing affection and admiration that these people have one for the other.

It is indeed a happy circumstance that I can welcome you for the first time on this soil not only as President of France but President of the French Community. Our people are just as anxious for the development of those countries under the sponsorship of France as is France itself, and in-

¹ Made at the Washington National Airport upon the arrival of President de Gaulle (White House press release dated Apr. 22).

deed we hope that our ties of friendship with the entire Community will be as strong and as close as have those ties with the people of your country.

And now, finally, may I welcome you more especially personally. I met you first 18 years ago, in the dark days of a world war. From that time on our association has grown ever closer. And I must assure you—as I have assured my own people time and again—that the debt that the cause of freedom owes to General de Gaulle has not only been strong but it is one that is widely understood, appreciated, in this country—as indeed I think it is in all other portions of the free world.

I repeat my welcome on behalf of the American people and for myself to a man who in war and peace has proved such a great friend to all of those who love human dignity and are dedicated to the welfare of humans everywhere. We thank you for being here.

President de Gaulle

Unofficial translation

From the bottom of my heart, thank you, Mr. President. Seeing you and listening to you, I feel once more in agreement. Here I am once again in the United States of America. I had not been here for 15 years. This time again on your invitation, that is, the invitation of a dear and illustrious friend. This is another proof that one does not resist President Eisenhower. It is also impossible to resist the powerful stream of events.

A grave international debate is going to take place in 3 weeks. Before joining this debate for France, it was indeed necessary that I converse with the President of the United States. In any case, I feel a deep satisfaction to visit and salute the great American people, dear to my heart and upon whom rests to a very great extent the fate of the entire free world.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, APRIL 22¹

President Eisenhower

Mr. President, Madame de Gaulle, and friends: It is indeed a happy privilege for me to welcome

¹ Made at the state dinner at the White House (White House press release dated Apr. 22).

President de Gaulle to this table on behalf of this company. My lasting respect and admiration for General de Gaulle began 18 years ago when I met him first in London. He and I were associates in a war, a desperate war, of which the hope was to gain a peace in which people could have faith and confidence.

At the end of that war we learned certain things about peace. One is that there is no peace merely because the cannons are still. Another is that many people talk about peace who are not talking honestly except as they conceive of a peace as a condition in which their opponents must surrender their privileges and rights and live in a state of serfdom.

Finally, we learn that peace is a rather delicate condition and characteristic, and it needs to be guarded with vigilance and with strength—with moral, intellectual, economic, and military strength.

Now General de Gaulle is a partner—with his country—of this country and this Government in waging the peace. In waging the peace we have other battles to fight. The campaigns and the battles against hunger, disease, privation, resentment, ignorance—all these are part of waging peace.

No single country can win this campaign by itself. We are proud indeed in this country that France with its great leader General de Gaulle is associated with us in this great effort—this worldwide effort; and more especially as a partner of ours in the great alliance of NATO, founded well over a decade ago to bring about a situation in which peace can be waged without fear and without bending to threat.

I can conceive of no more worthy partner that I should like to have at my side, in what efforts I can make toward waging the peace, than General de Gaulle. And for this reason I have a feeling of special honor in asking this company to join with me in a toast to General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic and the French Community.

President de Gaulle

Unofficial translation

Mr. President: Our two countries have given us—you and me—a sacred trust, that of Franco-American friendship. It seems to me that in our actions and in the performance of our duties we

have had the good fortune to preserve it and even to help it grow. Indeed, I do not believe that in the two countries since this flame was kindled the United States and France have ever been closer to each other in mind and in spirit.

Once again, only a short while ago, Mr. President, Paris gave you magnificent testimony of this when you were there on an official visit.⁴ And this morning Washington in return has just given an unforgettable truth: When the world is troubled, when danger hovers over the peoples, when those in authority face the task at one and the same time of opening the path of peace and finding the means to safeguard the right of man to liberty, this moral and political force constituted by the natural agreement of our two countries has a worth and an impact that are unparalleled.

The forthcoming international debate will no doubt afford a new opportunity for demonstrating this. But I must point out that in any case no one has contributed to it more eminently, more effectively in the light of history, than President Eisenhower, in time of war and in time of peace.

In saying this, Mr. President, I am expressing the sentiments that we feel, my wife and I, when we are with you and Mrs. Eisenhower. I am also expressing the cordial and trusting frankness that inspire me in the talks that we have begun.

I raise my glass to President Eisenhower, the Government of the United States, to the American people—the friend and ally of France.

REMARKS AND TOAST BY SECRETARY HERTER⁵

Mr. President, Madame de Gaulle, ladies and gentlemen: France has traditionally maintained a preeminent position in the export of ideas, the least perishable of commodities. Ideas are immortal; their imprint can never entirely be erased. As a great American jurist [Oliver Wendell Holmes] once remarked, the human mind, once stretched by a new idea, can never return to its

original shape. The destinies of many nations, including our own, have been indelibly stamped by ideas forged in France.

The importance of the material and political aid which France furnished to the American Colonies in their struggle for independence is gratefully appreciated. But equally important to the cause of American independence were the political theories of the 18th-century *philosophes*. They provided both sparks and fuel for the American Revolution. A decade later Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois* served as a handbook for the framers of the American Constitution. The doctrines of the French Revolution redrew the map of Europe. The words *liberté, égalité, fraternité* overran more nations than the armies of Napoleon. The Declaration of the Rights of Man won France more allies than the ministrations of Talleyrand. In areas of the world where French soldiers have never set foot, there is a *présence française*, a far-flung commonwealth of the spirit, established by words which have sprung from a Frenchman's pen and secured by the thirst for products of French thought.

The mind of each of this planet's 2 billion and more inhabitants is a battlefield in the ideological struggle between the Communist system and the free world. On these battlefields the weapons are ideas. Throughout the centuries France has been stockpiling ideas which, now as in the past, are rallying men's minds to the cause of human dignity and individual freedom. Foremost among France's contributions to the ideological arsenal of democracy in recent years are the soul-stirring words of General de Gaulle and the high standards of conduct and character that he has set for our and future generations. In those crucial early years of World War II, General de Gaulle, your words, your courage, and your faith in the indomitable spirit of France redirected France on her historic course. Almost two turbulent decades later, crisis called again to place the destiny of France in your hands. Today, as 20 years ago, you speak to and for France, but you also speak to and for freedom-loving people everywhere. Today, and always, your words, your faith, and your courage will serve as an inspiration to free men in their hours of need.

Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the French Republic and of the French Community.

⁴ During his 11-nation visit to Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa Dec. 3-22, 1959, President Eisenhower attended a meeting of the Western heads of state and government at Paris Dec. 19-21; for background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 11, 1960, p. 46.

⁵ Made at a luncheon given in honor of President and Mme. de Gaulle at Anderson House on Apr. 25 (press release 213).

Progress and Potential in South Asia: the Example of India

by Ellsworth Bunker
Ambassador to India¹

My assigned subject is South Asia. According to the Department of State's definition, South Asia comprises the countries of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Ceylon. The area is thus defined, however, largely for administrative purposes. One becomes increasingly conscious of the rapidly growing interdependence of nations; the problems and progress of one impinge upon and affect, in one way or another, the problems and progress of all.

In this great subcontinent of South Asia live more than 530 million people, nearly three times the population of the United States. They vary from the most sophisticated and cultivated people I have ever met to simple peasants in hidden mountain valleys who do not even use the wheel.

The area contains a cross section of the world's religions: Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Jain, Sikh, Animist, Parsee, Christian—the Mar Thomas Church of Kerala is said to be the oldest Christian sect in existence—and small pockets of Judaism which date almost from Roman times.

There is a babel of languages. Take India alone. Her Constitution recognizes 14 official languages. A linguistic survey of the country some years ago listed 225 main languages and dialects. These countries are new to the modern world of politics and economics. Three of them—India, Pakistan, and Ceylon—are former colonial possessions. Nepal was opened to the world only a decade ago after a century of feudal rule. Afghanistan, the ancient pathway of India's conquerors, was until this century a strategic prize

sought after by two of the world's great empires.

Yet these countries of South Asia share memories of former greatness, of civilizations and cultures which were among the most advanced in the world. Monuments of a glorious past are found everywhere and keep alive a pride of their history among the people.

Cultures persist in habits of thought, traditions, customs, philosophies, and so shape reactions to events and circumstances. One is aware of their outward manifestations in the courtesy, dignity, and grace one sees among people in all walks of life, in the ability to derive joy and pleasure from simple things, in a sensitivity to beauty.

They share something else in common, too, something that has been aptly called "the revolution of rising expectations." It is to that "revolution" and its implications for all of us that I should like to direct most of my remarks tonight. But if you will permit me I shall talk mostly in terms of India, both because I am more familiar with it and because within its border live about four-fifths of the people of South Asia. Her problems I think will illustrate those of the other countries as well.

Differences of Outlook and Development

This does not mean that there are not significant differences both in outlook and in stage of development among the nations of South Asia.

For example, the proudly independent, land-locked kingdom of Afghanistan has ambitious plans for rapid economic development. For a variety of reasons, some historical and some logistical, these plans are probably more difficult to carry out than are plans of a similar nature in other South Asian nations. The United States is

¹Address made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 23 (press release 209).

assisting Afghanistan in its development efforts, and we believe that our assistance will materially help her sturdy people to maintain their independence.

Ceylon, in contrast, is more fortunate than the other South Asian nations in a strictly economic sense. Yet the creation of a common sense of purpose and destiny, shared by all the diverse parts of Ceylon's population, is proving more difficult than fostering economic growth. We are helping Ceylon in her effort to achieve a better life for her people, and I have faith that, with no outside interference, Ceylon's carefully nurtured democratic tradition will prove to be equal to the tasks facing it.

Pakistan, unlike India, which is a secular state, came into being as a Muslim nation. Its eastern and western areas separated by more than a thousand miles of Indian territory, at the beginning it faced problems of administration, economic development, and political stability. Much of the period after independence was characterized by economic stagnation and political uncertainty. But under President Ayub's government impressive progress is being achieved in virtually all fields. Vigorous efforts are being made to use effectively the country's own resources and foreign assistance in stepping up the rate of economic growth. Efficiency of administration has been vastly improved, corruption rooted out, and a far greater degree of political stability has been achieved than at any time since independence.

One of the most encouraging recent developments—and from our point of view a most welcome one—has been the substantial improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. Both sides deserve credit for this happy development. It has borne fruit in two agreements for the settlement of the border disputes between the two countries. Concerning the knotty problem of the division of the Indus basin waters, the Governments of India and Pakistan have long been striving to reach a settlement in negotiations under the auspices of the World Bank. In the summer of 1959 they agreed in principle on a Bank plan designed to insure the supply of water to both parties. Because of the magnitude of the system of works necessary to carry out this division of waters between the two countries, the Bank has proposed that financial assistance be provided by itself and by a group of friendly governments. Subject to neces-

sary congressional action, which is now being sought, the United States proposes to join with other free-world countries in the financing plan elaborated by the Bank.² The Governments of India and Pakistan are now engaged in negotiating a definitive water treaty to govern the settlement, and it is hoped that they may shortly be able to agree on all outstanding points. The conclusion of this treaty and the implementation of the Bank plan will mark a great step forward in the improvement of relations between the two countries and in the economic development of the area.

A notable difference between Pakistan and the other nations of South Asia lies in the field of foreign policy. While the other countries follow a policy of nonalignment, Pakistan is a staunch supporter of the principle of collective security and as such is a member of both CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] and SEATO [South-east Asia Treaty Organization].

The mountain kingdom of Nepal has but recently emerged from centuries of seclusion and feudalism. Lying athwart the Himalayas with 500 miles of its northern border contiguous to Tibet, it occupies a strategic position in the subcontinent. Now a constitutional monarchy with a popularly elected Parliament, it is attempting to bridge the gap to the 20th century. Here progress is bound to be slower than in India or Pakistan both because of past history, meager capital formation, and because of the formidable problem of communication. When the King goes out among his people, as he frequently does, it means often a 6- or 7-week trip on foot and horseback. When one asks the distance between villages, it is usually given in terms of the number of days' walk. Aid commensurate with Nepal's ability to absorb it is being given by India and the United States. Communist China has also been giving aid and has made further commitments recently. Russia last year signed an aid agreement with Nepal amounting to about one-third of what we have so far committed.

The Nepalese are an independent, sturdy, industrious people. The Gorkhas, who form units of both the Indian and British armies, are among the world's best soldiers. Under an enlightened monarch, an intelligent and devoted Prime Minister and Cabinet, Nepal is set to move forward.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 21, 1960, p. 442.

In India a vast and varied population is in the throes of a peaceful "revolution," engaged in one of history's great experiments. The outcome of that experiment will determine whether an underdeveloped country, with a vast population increasingly aware of higher standards of living elsewhere, can build a progressive economy, raise living standards, develop sound social institutions, and achieve political stability within a democratic framework.

It is obvious, I think, that success or failure of this experiment will have far-reaching consequences throughout the world. The people of the newly independent nations especially are watching to see whether adequate, steady progress can be made within the terms of a free society or whether they will have to turn to the regimented methods of a totalitarian system; in short, whether they will have to surrender many of the values for which they have so long sacrificed and struggled.

It would be difficult, I think, to overstress our stake in the success of this great experiment. We want to see the principle of government by consent of the governed firmly established, its structure strengthened in this vitally important area of the world. We want to see the standard of living of these millions of human beings raised without loss of human freedom. We know that it is to our interest both in terms of our own prosperity and of the values we cherish that these things should come about. For, as President Eisenhower has said, we have learned that often the best way for ourselves to succeed is to help others to progress.

To this end we have provided India and the other countries of South Asia with large amounts of aid. The taxpayers of the United States, who are providing the necessary funds, are entitled to an answer to the question of whether this is a solid investment.

Problems Facing India

What is the balance sheet in India, for example? On the debit side there is an array of formidable difficulties. On the credit side there are many assets. Most important, as the balancing item, there is a record of solid achievement in the brief 12 years of India's independence.

Let us look at the left-hand side of the ledger—the debit side.

There is the matter of geography and climate. Shielded by the great barrier of the Himalayas from the cold winds of northern Asia the subcontinent for the greater part of the year lies under a canopy of intense heat.

There is the question of food. The caloric intake of Indians as a whole averages only about two-thirds of what is considered to be an adequate diet.

One wonders what effect such a climate and diet have on the energies and capacity to work of the people. Yet I confess to being constantly amazed at seeing men and women plowing their fields or harvesting their crops seemingly unaware of the intense heat of the summer sun, or working on one of the great new dams or on a construction job for long daily hours and often 6 or 7 days a week. The manager of a large construction job told me men and women got equal pay and that frequently the women turned in more work than the men. When I expressed surprise, he said it could be explained by the fact that the men spent more time gossiping—which goes to show, I suppose, that men are much the same the world over.

But there are problems other than those posed by climate or other natural phenomena with which the builders of the new India have been and are faced—problems of an economic, social, and psychological nature.

The first thing to keep in mind is the short experience of the country as an independent nation—only 12½ years.

The new nation came into being with the responsibility of governing and providing for over 320 million people and at the very outset suffered the terrible shock of partition. More than 10 million refugees moved from Pakistan to India or from India to Pakistan in 1947, uprooted from their homes, communities, and businesses. Countless thousands died by violence (bloodshed greater than our own Civil War), from exposure, disease, or exhaustion, or in the floods that compounded the nightmare. The economic and social trauma was immense.

Divisive forces, or, as the Indians say, "fissiparous" tendencies are at work. India has, for example, 14 official languages. Each is as different, one from the other, as French and German, English and Italian. Most have their own ancient literatures, and each is spoken by millions of

people. For example, as many people speak Telegu, one of the languages of the south, as speak Dutch, Flemish, Finnish, Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish combined. The Indian Constitution establishes Hindi, the most widely understood language, as the official national tongue but allows for the continued official use also of English until 1965, a date which may be extended by law. Strong opposition to Hindi, particularly in south India, makes such an extension probable.

With about one-third of the United States land area, India must now support a population of over 410 million—a population which is increasing at about the rate of 2 percent a year. In the face of this increase, immense efforts are needed to feed and employ the people of India even at their present standard of living, to say nothing of increasing it.

Besides the pressure of human population, there is that of a huge animal population. It is generally accepted that a substantial portion of the nation's food crop is destroyed or consumed by domestic and wild animals.

The rapid growth of the human population compounds another problem: poverty. The average per capita income is less than \$70 a year, one of the world's lowest. And less than 20 percent of the people of India can read or write.

Add to these things the still remaining prejudices and barriers of caste, and habits of resignation and acceptance fostered by centuries of foreign rule, and the problems to overcome are enormous.

Accomplishments Since Independence

So much for liabilities. What of India's assets? On the right-hand side of the ledger there is a huge reservoir of easily trainable manpower; a large body of private industry with good managerial skills and a great deal of initiative; immense resources of fertile land never intensively cultivated and only waiting to be awakened into high productivity by the application of water, fertilizer, and modern methods; large resources of iron ore and coal situated close together as if designed by nature for convenience and economy in steelmaking; manganese, thorium, cotton, jute, tea; and large potential sources of power. In the field of administration one finds the largest trained body of dedicated and highly qualified civil servants in the developing world. Yet most important

of all, to my mind, is an intangible asset, a genuine sense of purpose and devotion in those charged with the development of the country.

If one reviews what has been accomplished in the brief years since independence one must conclude, I think, that these assets have been effectively employed. The list is impressive by any standard.

The shock of partition has been survived. Some 554 princely states, comprising one-third of the land area of the nation and one-quarter of its population, have been peacefully assimilated into the Indian union.

A democratic Constitution has been drafted and put into effect. Collaborating in its drafting were a Brahmin and an untouchable. Like our own, it guarantees freedom of speech, press, and worship, protects the rights of minorities, and establishes the rule of law and an independent judiciary. It gives equal status for women and equal recognition of all religions, despite the overwhelming predominance of the Hindu religion, and seeks to break many of the shackles of outworn tradition.

For example, it outlaws untouchability, the most brutal manifestation of caste. Although the position of the untouchable—or *harijan*, child of God, as Mahatma Gandhi called him—is still a difficult one, progress has been made. With our own problems concerning segregation, I think we can look with sympathy and understanding on India's efforts in this area.

Political stability has been maintained despite all of the stresses and strains which India has undergone since 1947. Her leaders have firmly held to democratic methods, maintained free and open debate, made no attempt to stifle criticism from the press or the opposition political parties, and remain determined to bring to all of the people the benefits of freedom.

There have been two general elections in India, in 1951-52 and in 1957, in which the largest free electorate in the world participated. The roots of democracy struck deeper, and democratic institutions were strengthened. Through the elections people realized that they were a part of the new India and had a voice in its destiny.

In fact, from the first days of independence the people were made to feel that their nation was based on the principles of social justice. Mr. Dhebar, when President of the Congress Party,

summed up these principles as "equality of opportunity, equality of status, and security." From the very beginning it was accepted as a fact that the achievement of these objectives would depend on economic development, on the ability to make steady progress in raising living standards, and in developing sound social institutions in the fields of health, welfare, and education.

Toward this end India has been engaged since 1951 in planned economic development on an increasingly massive scale. The decision was made that the nation's limited resources must be husbanded and directed into channels where they could be used most effectively. There is nothing to spare, nothing to waste, in India. Hence a greater degree of control over the direction of investment is necessary than in the more highly industrialized nations whose economic development has been evolving over a much longer period of time.

One 5-year plan has been successfully completed. The second is nearing its close. The initial draft of the third has just been formulated. Under the plans so far agricultural production has been increased by 30 percent and industrial production by 50 percent. Gross national product in recent years has grown at the rate of about 4 percent a year. With an annual population increase of about 2 percent, per capita income has also grown about 2 percent a year.

The target for the third-plan period, 1961-66, is a 5 or 6 percent annual increase in gross national product. This surely is reasonable in terms of need, when one considers the low level of present per capita income. I believe it possible of achievement, given the fact that the current 4 percent rate of increase has been achieved in a period when primary emphasis has been on the development of basic industry, which does not immediately bring about a quick rise in the national product. During the coming plan period new steel mills will be in production, new dams will be producing electricity and water for irrigation, and other new industrial projects will add to the nation's economic life.

Multilateral Economic Assistance

To date United States assistance to India has been slightly more than \$2 billion. A little less than half of the total has been in the form of surplus agricultural commodities. Considering

this amount on a per capita basis, the total is not large—less than \$5 a person.

Our assistance has entered into nearly every phase of India's economic development, public and private. We have, so far, built no monuments which can be pointed out to the visitor from the States as "the American steel mill" or "the American dam." But the overall effect of our assistance on India's progress has been greater, I feel, than if we had concentrated on this type of aid. Our help has been given where it was most needed.

There has been substantial assistance from other foreign sources—the International Bank, Britain, West Germany, Japan, Canada, the Soviet Union, and the Soviet bloc. The total from free-world sources other than the United States amounts to \$1.3 billion; the Soviet bloc total is \$773 million, although most of this will not be available until 1961 or later.

The third 5-year plan will require about \$5½ billion of foreign exchange. The United States and other countries will undoubtedly be called upon to help bridge this gap. In my view we should respond generously.

It is probable that Soviet bloc aid will continue in substantial quantity. From all indications our friends also will continue or increase the level of their assistance. The Japanese have recently entered into an agreement for further development of India's tremendous iron ore reserves, the British will be in a position to lend greater assistance, and the expanding economy of West Germany probably can be counted on for increased aid. Other countries may enter the picture, as Austria did recently with an offer of a \$20 million loan for machinery and capital goods.

I am the more convinced that we should continue our aid in view of the fact that India has been determined to help herself. She has had the courage and the necessary discipline to impose on herself a regime of strict austerity.

In the first 4 years of the second plan she spent \$1.1 billion of her foreign exchange, bringing reserves to the minimum figure of \$420 million. An already austere import program has recently been further curtailed; luxury imports are absolutely banned, as indeed are some imports necessary to adequate maintenance of the economy and desirable for its expansion. Further restraints on consumption are being imposed by the increase in indirect taxes in the new budget and a broadening of the tax base. Capital imports, no matter

how much needed, are not allowed unless foreign exchange is available to pay for them. In short, the immediate interests of consumers have been subordinated to the long-term interest of the country as a whole.

India has been solicitous of the international reputation and standing of the rupee. She has scrupulously honored her commitments for repatriation of profits and capital. She has repaid a substantial portion of her drawings from the International Monetary Fund. She has honored her international obligations.

I think you would agree with me that through all these measures, voluntarily undertaken, India meets the conditions for concentrated assistance enunciated by ICA Director Riddleberger last month to the House Foreign Affairs Committee as "full determination and disciplined self-help, plus an economic, institutional, and human base capable of accelerated growth. . . ."³

India is demonstrating in action the truth of President Eisenhower's words that: "New nations, and others struggling with the problem of development, will progress only . . . if they demonstrate faith in their own destiny and possess the will and use their own resources to fulfill it."⁴

Her leaders fully recognize the fact that the task confronting them is so immense that it requires the mobilization of all available resources, public and private, domestic and foreign. The private sector of the Indian economy is active and vigorous. It has played a great part in India's progress to date. Foreign investors have made a significant contribution also, and this is growing. Wherever you go in India you will meet businessmen from Britain, West Germany, Japan, and other countries "on business." The enormous potential market of over 410 million people is attracting attention. I am glad to say that more and more American firms are showing an interest in the country.

Foreign private capital is welcome in a very wide and increasing range of activities. Almost any sound and attractive proposition will be sympathetically considered, for in Mr. Nehru's own words the approach to the "socialistic pattern of society" in India is "not rigid." In discussing planning he has said the "national plan need not, and indeed should not have rigidity. I am not

at all dogmatic about it. We have to learn from practical experience and proceed in our own way."

Progress and Potential

I have traveled in practically every corner of India and have retraced my steps over most of it several times. I have been constantly struck by the change for the better to be seen in each area on each trip. We have had four United States trade missions in India during my tenure as Ambassador. These were comprised of experienced businessmen who knew their fields. In every case the members of the missions have come back to Delhi impressed by what they have seen of India's progress and even more impressed by the potential of the land. I wish that all of you could see for yourselves.

India is entering upon a crucial stage in its development. Momentum in progress has been built up. It must be maintained if India is to reach the point of "takeoff" and become a self-generating economy with the chance of realizing her truly immense potential.

At this time the relations between our two countries are, in the words of my friend Ambassador Chagla,⁵ at an "alltime high." This is the result of many factors. The press has had its great share in the development of understanding between India and America. So have the excellent ambassadors India has sent to the United States. Most important of all, perhaps, is the sharing of deepest convictions and ideals. India is nonaligned, to be sure, as we were for the first 150 years of our national life. But in the great struggle of the present day—the preservation and broadening of the dignity and rights of man—there is no doubt where India stands. She has chosen the democratic way of life.

In more than 3 years of service in India, I have talked with its leaders, its businessmen, its educators, men and women from all walks of life. Like my notorious colleague of *The Ugly American* I have attended many cocktail parties—in India we call them receptions—where I usually meet my friends of the press and often acquire from them information I find useful in my trade. Unlike him, I have gone to the "boondocks" and talked with the farmers and the villagers. From

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 21, 1960, p. 445.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1960, p. 111.

⁵ Mahomedali Currim Chagla, Indian Ambassador to the United States.

all of these contacts I think I have gained an insight into their problems, their weaknesses, and their strength. I have talked also with innumerable Americans of every business and profession who have visited or worked in India, gaining their impressions and benefiting from their experience.

Based upon this study, and against the background of a lifetime of business experience in the United States, it is my considered opinion that India can, with proper help, succeed in the great experiment—this great adventure, Mr. Nehru has called it—upon which she is engaged. I also believe strongly that it is vital for the free world that she do succeed. What India can do, the other countries of South Asia, given time, patience, and understanding assistance, can also do.

What does this mean for us?

It means waging a war, together with our friends not only in India but in the whole subcontinent, against poverty and disease and illiteracy, for human dignity and the means to live decently for hundreds of millions of people in this vast area of the globe.

Is the Tide Turning in Asia?

by Howard P. Jones
*Ambassador to Indonesia*¹

As my topic this evening I propose to discuss the current role of the United States in the Far East, that portion of Asia which includes perhaps one-third of the world's population and a good deal more than one-third of its problems. My purpose is to offer a sort of stocktaking in an attempt to find a partial answer to the question: How far have we come in the Far East, where are we now, and where are we going?

Let us start off by looking at two contrasting policies for the Far East. One of them is our own.

¹ Address made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 23 (press release 211 dated Apr. 22).

It means waging a war against complacency, luxury, and smugness at home. It means humility to acknowledge that we haven't yet found all the answers, that nations and people are bound to develop systems suited to their own genius, needs, and traditions, that the set of values they live by may legitimately differ from ours.

It means, finally, waging peace—creating situations where men have the incentive and desire to live with one another in tolerance, good will, in dignity and peace.

This is a time of opportunity for us in Government to help where help is desperately needed and where it can and will be put to constructive use. It is a time of opportunity for us in private industry to combine opportunities for legitimate profit with the challenge of helping to build a great modern industrial nation. Here is a call to industrial statesmanship.

"There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. . . . We must take the current when it serves, or lose our ventures."

Our contacts with the Far East began well over a hundred years ago, when speedy American clipper ships plied the trade routes between Asia and the West, American missionaries and philanthropic foundations began their program of educational work in China, and an American naval expedition brought Japan out of its centuries of isolation. These early links were forged largely by individuals—traders, seamen, naval officers, missionaries, and diplomats with extraordinarily flexible instructions. By the end of the 19th century, however, the United States had begun the creation of a national policy toward the Far East, one which has maintained a strong thread of consistency over the intervening 60 years.

This national policy can best be stated in terms of our primary objective in Asia: the emergence

of a free community of responsible self-governing nations, each able to follow its individual destiny without outside interference. This objective, which stands out clearly today as the cornerstone of our Far Eastern policy, was plainly visible in the Open Door policy toward China announced in 1899 and is today evident in our continued championship of Asian freedom against external aggression. Following the cataclysmic upheavals of the Second World War, this same basic policy led us to grant independence to the Philippines, an independence we had fostered and prepared for over 40 years. Consistently, we also supported Indonesian independence and that of other countries in southeast Asia which had been colonies. This policy was also evident in our approach to a defeated Japan, which we treated not as a conquered province but as a potential friend to be assisted in its physical and moral regeneration.

Today this basic policy is the foundation of our friendship and cooperation with the free nations of the Far East. We seek politically, economically, and militarily to help these countries preserve their hard-won independence and to assist them in their aspirations for a better life for their peoples. These aims are based, of course, not only on idealistic reasons but also firmly on our own broad self-interest.

Policy of Red China

Let us now look at another policy, that of Red China.

To do this, let us imagine ourselves temporarily occupying the chair of the Chinese Communist "foreign minister" in Peiping. First of all, he is a doctrinaire Communist dedicated, in the words of Liu Shao-chi, "to . . . transform the present world into a Communist world."² This is not a dedication to a goal to be realized only in the distant future. It is one, he believes, which is actually being achieved before his eyes. Not only do the Communists consider the victory of socialism inevitable in the long run, but Mao Tse-tung has said, and the words have been interminably drummed into the 650 million inhabitants of the Chinese mainland, "The East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind"—"dynamic socialism" is now prevailing over "decadent capitalism and imperialism."

² Liu Shao-chi, *How To Be a Good Communist*, 1951.

Glancing around the periphery of his huge domain, the Chinese Communist "foreign minister" sees to his north and west the comforting presence of the Soviet Union. He tends to think in military terms as well as ideological, since he rose to power by his military experience. The leaders of this, the second most powerful military concentration on earth, are, like himself, Communists and dedicated to the same ultimate goals. He may be feeling his oats a little and willing to spar with the Russian leaders on tactics, but they remain his firm friends, who provide him with the technology and the materials, both military and industrial, needed for his own monumental plans. Indeed, the material and technological advances of the Soviet Union, the Russian sputniks and missiles, encourage his doctrinaire belief that the East Wind is prevailing over the West. He is satisfied for the present, but our Chinese Communist "foreign minister" may have the beginnings of thoughts about the future, when Communist China's own grandiose economic plans are no longer blueprints and the usefulness of the Soviet Union is past. But for the present, while making sure that his views are heard in Moscow, he willingly acknowledges the leadership of the Soviet Union.

Looking to the east, the situation is not to his liking. Japan, which could be an invaluable industrial and technological bastion of the Asian Communist world, has become a bastion of the free world. Because of the American deterrent he cannot at present contemplate a direct assault on Japan. He can, however, continue his attempts to subvert Japan's freedom. He does this through threats and cajolery, interference in Japan's internal affairs, the use of Japan's Communist Party and fellow travelers, the use of trade boycotts and deceptive offers of trade, the employment of every illicit Communist instrument and method.

On his opposite flank is India, a tempting target. The time, however, may not yet be ripe. The "foreign minister" in Peiping sees India's stable government, its international prestige, its membership in the British Commonwealth, and the facts of geography as obstacles requiring caution, indeed perhaps requiring a little retrenchment in Communist China's present policies.

Between these two flanks, each still beyond his reach, the Chinese Communist "foreign minister" sees what he may believe is a more immediate op-

portunity. The southeast Asian peninsula and the Philippine and Indonesian islands beyond are laden with the resources his country desperately wants to complete its mammoth plans: an abundance of raw materials to feed the forced growth of Communist China's industries and rich, relatively empty, agricultural land for its uncomfortably expanding population. He is determined to establish Chinese hegemony over this region through one tactic or another.

Reluctant to risk the dangers of a direct assault while other less provocative means continue to give promise of results, he sees possibilities in subversion and diplomatic pressure. He feels that these tactics may be fruitful because they are aimed directly at the weaknesses of these countries. For with only a few exceptions, the area suffers from widespread poverty and illiteracy, economic instability, political immaturity, shortage of capital, shortage of administrators and technicians, shortage of schools and colleges. It is rife with deep-seated resentments, social unrest, and the aspirations of the people for a shortcut to a better life and emancipation from age-old poverty. Communist China feels that these conditions are ready made for its methods of subversion and coercion, which it seeks to carry out while combating any progress toward stability and regional cohesion.

Less than a hundred miles off the coast of southeast China the Chinese Communist "foreign minister's" eyes light upon the most troublesome spot of all—Taiwan. Here he finds not only a sign of uncompleted business, a province he regards as an inalienable part of China not under the iron grip of communism, but also a living challenge and rebuke to the excesses on the mainland. The island is the site of the Republic of China, evidence that a free China, espousing the traditional and real ideals of China, still exists. This free China has demonstrated to the world, moreover, that real economic and social development can be achieved and the living standards of its citizens materially raised without resort to the regimentation and denial of human values found necessary by Red China to drive the Chinese people into serving the Communist state.

The Chinese Communist "foreign minister" does not nor can he be expected to miss an opportunity of declaring Communist China's right and determination to seize Taiwan.

Deterrent Power of the United States

Certainly no normal inhibitions against the use of force restrain Communist China from attacking Taiwan, southeast Asia, or Japan. Her record in Korea, the Taiwan Straits, Tibet, and elsewhere bears witness to this. The only inhibition the Peiping regime understands is the risk involved in initiating a military venture. The chief factor in this risk is the deterrent power of the United States in the Far East. How does the Communist "foreign minister" look at the United States? From before the establishment of the Peiping regime, it selected the United States as its enemy. In 1948 Liu Shao-chi, now chairman of the regime, described the world in terms of its being divided into two antagonistic camps, the "socialist" camp, led by the Soviet Union, and the "imperialist" camp, led by the United States. These camps stand in intense conflict, according to Liu, and there can be no neutrality between them. As recently as April 10, 1960, Chou En-lai, premier of the regime, described the United States as an aggressor against China, bent on arms expansion and war preparations, encircling China with bases for attack, reviving Japanese militarism, and bent on establishing colonial rule over China and the rest of Asia. In short, Communist China recognizes the United States as the principal obstacle in the path of establishing its hegemony over the Far East. A primary intent of Peiping's policy is to drive us out of the western Pacific, or in the propaganda words of Peiping uttered on March 4 of this year, "U.S. imperialism, get out of the western Pacific! U.S. aggressors must go back where they came from."

There is nothing in this estimate of Chinese Communist thinking that has not been confirmed either by the open boasting or the actions of the regime. Thus we have the central problem and the central fact of affairs in the Far East today. Between our objective of a free community of responsible, independent nations and the Communist Chinese objective of a collection of communized satellite states there is no halfway mark.

We know that the military and economic power of Communist China is unquestionably increasing. Its rulers have shown themselves to be fanatic and aggressive, willing to force the most extreme sacrifices from their people. They are, in effect, gamblers, playing for the highest of stakes. They have wagered their regime's future on their ability

to drive their populace to the uttermost limits of endurance without breaking. Popular dissatisfaction with the regime's inhuman pressures is substantial and may grow still more, but we cannot count on this to reverse soon its expansionism. For the foreseeable future we must count on the fact of a powerful and aggressive Communist China at the center of the Far Eastern world, but one that a determined free world can hold in check.

Danger in the Years Ahead

This does not, of course, mean that we are inevitably committed to an armed clash with Communist China. However impressive the growth of Communist Chinese power, it will not in the foreseeable future approach that of ours. Only an act of arrogant blindness on the part of the Chinese Communists, a blindness with which they are not yet afflicted, will bring their forces deliberately into direct conflict with those of the United States. Existing on naked power, they respect power.

The danger over the years ahead, I believe, is that the Communists through constant pressure and attrition will succeed in their aim of causing us to abandon the policies and positions with which we are, with ever-increasing success, holding them in check. This can come about if we grow weary of the never-ending struggle and withdraw our restraining presence and support from the Communist targets. It can also come about if, in an effort to achieve more rapid results, we lose patience in the delicate task of working with the other nations of the Far East and attempt to substitute pressure for persuasion or coercion for cooperation.

At the same time we must not be deterred by the fact that there is no easy solution to the problem posed by Communist China. One such "easy solution" which is advanced from time to time calls for a change in United States policy in the direction of an accommodation with Communist China while at the same time we maintain our commitment to Taiwan as Taiwan. Perhaps I need only quote Chou En-lai again to show that this "solution" solves nothing. Addressing the National People's Congress on April 10, 1960, the Chinese Communist premier said in reiteration

of the line that has marked all Peiping's utterances on the subject since the regime's establishment 11 years ago:

To liberate Taiwan is China's internal affair, in which no outsider may interfere. However, the United States demands that China give up its sacred, sovereign right to liberate its own territory, Taiwan. . . . At the same time, the United States is trying all sorts of ways to create "two Chinas" in an attempt to legalize its seizure of Taiwan. . . . The Chinese Government hereby declares once again that the Chinese people resolutely oppose the United States plots to create "two Chinas". China absolutely will not participate in any international conference or organization wherein a "two Chinas" situation may appear.

Common Characteristics of Southeast Asian States

I have indicated my belief that the Chinese Communist regime looks upon southeast Asia as one of its primary targets for expansion. Not only the Chinese Communists but some others may think of southeast Asia as a region of small, weak states existing largely in the shadow of the three giant nations of east Asia—a sort of "Asian Balkans" serving more as a field for the international activities of other countries than as a dynamic participant in those activities. This view is so erroneous and of such potential danger to the shaping of policy that I should like to devote a few moments specifically to that region.

In actuality the southeast Asian states are by no means swaying helplessly before the blasts from the outside world. Nor are they so many peas in a pod, to be approached jointly with an identical set of policies for all. Each of the southeast Asian countries is very much an individual with a personality of its own. Roughly half of the region consists of a single nation, Indonesia, in population the sixth largest country on the globe and one which may be competing with Japan for fifth place within the next decade. Smaller than Indonesia are the four states of roughly similar size—Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, and divided Viet-Nam—each with a rapidly expanding population approximating that of Egypt or Turkey. The remaining four independent entities of southeast Asia—Malaya, Laos, Cambodia, and Singapore—are of key strategic importance to the political and economic well-being of the world.

From the 90 million Indonesians to the million

or so citizens of the new city-state of Singapore, the southeast Asians display an extraordinary variety in their chosen forms of government, their cultures, the level of their economic development, and in their national aspirations. At the same time, however, they share a number of common characteristics. With the sole exception of Thailand, all of them have emerged from colonial status within the past 15 years and their attitudes are still strongly affected by the psychological aftermath of colonialism. All except Singapore are based on an economy of subsistence agriculture, which engages the overwhelming bulk of their people. All are dependent on agricultural and mineral exports to obtain the manufactured goods which their own infant industries cannot yet produce in volume. All suffer to a greater or lesser degree from the byproducts of their newness as nations: limited experience on the part of their leaders, a paucity of trained civil servants to staff their administrations, a political party system still in the early unstable stages of evolution, and, at times, a certain confusion as to aims and goals. All have also inherited to some extent a problem that continues to assume larger proportions as the power and ambitions of Communist China expand, that of the commercially powerful 12 million overseas Chinese settled among them. Finally, all share a fierce determination never again to fall into the role of colony or satellite to another power, whether that power be European or Asian.

Southeast Asian Suspicions of the West

This passionate dedication to their own independence is a chief component of the most powerful psychological force in southeast Asia today, that of nationalism. Basically, of course, nationalism is simply a feeling of unity with one's fellow citizens, a special pride in one's country, and a special dedication to its interests. In much of southeast Asia, however, it has come to encompass a number of other deep-seated attitudes and emotions that have not all been fully understood in the West.

As one example I might mention a fairly widespread southeast Asian attitude toward capitalism. In several countries of the region a form of socialism has been proclaimed as national policy. When I speak of capitalism, the image in my mind is, of course, that of our own extraordinarily successful system of free enterprise. To many an Indo-

nesian, however, the same word conjures up a totally different image, that of alien control of his country's economy. Socialism represents the recapture of this control by his own government and people. It must be realized that, in the context of his own experience, his image of capitalism is valid. Due to various historical factors, capitalism in Indonesia has for centuries been the almost exclusive province of foreigners, European or Chinese. For him to be convinced that modern capitalism is not exploitative and does not imply foreign domination—that, to the contrary, it offers the best path toward economic independence and development—will require time and mutual understanding.

Similar gulfs in understanding appear in other fields. We and the new nations of southeast Asia have known each other for only a score of years, a time insufficient to erase entirely a suspicion of our motives which, however unfounded, is honestly held. During their struggles for political independence many of the southeast Asian nationalists were unable to look beyond that shining goal to see the many vexing problems that continue to beset independent nations. When achievement of their long-sought goal brought in its wake not immediate prosperity and stability but a painful, often prolonged period of vexation and readjustment, their reaction was often one of bewilderment. Unable to ascribe their difficulties to the sacred cause of independence itself, some of them quite naturally sought to lay the blame elsewhere: on the former metropolitan power, the prevailing capitalist system, or remaining foreign-owned enterprises. As these institutions were predominantly of Western origin, the West itself became, to an extent, a focus for suspicion.

In discussing a still-existing southeast Asian suspicion toward the West, I do not wish to exaggerate its magnitude. Most of the southeast Asian nationalists are by no means motivated by a fanatic mistrust of Western institutions. Most are rational people, many of them familiar with Western institutions and sincerely anxious to adapt the best of those institutions to their own societies. We must recognize, however, that our image in the eyes of many southeast Asians is not that which we hold toward ourselves. At the same time, through patience, understanding, and a sincere respect for their individuality, I believe that we have made substantial progress in reconciling these two images.

In their individual assessment of the internal and external threats that menace their new status, and in the ways they have chosen to meet those threats, these nations of southeast Asia have followed widely diverging courses. Thailand and the Philippines have sought security through co-operation with other nations of the free world in SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization]. Indonesia, Burma, and Cambodia have felt their security best served by avoiding such arrangements and depending on a policy of nonalignment for protection. It is not our part to criticize this policy. While we may have well-founded reservations as to the utility of nonalignment in fending off a determined aggressor, we fully respect the freedom of choice of those who adhere to it. We recognize that, whatever methods the southeast Asian states may select to achieve their goals, the goals themselves are virtually identical to ours. They wish primarily to be left in freedom from outside interference in order to develop their own institutions in their own way. Our own objectives in the Far East will be on the way to fulfillment if this wish is achieved.

These, then, are the main components of the Far Eastern world today: a powerful and aggressive Communist China, a bastion of the free world in Japan, and a cordon of struggling new nations attempting to shape their individual destinies in southeast Asia. The picture is one of incessant dynamic change, in which there are few constants. The direction that this change will take can have the most vital impact on the entire world. Our own future may well depend upon it.

Comparison of Far East in 1950 and 1960

It is difficult to chart the course of this dynamic, complex world of the Far East from a study of day-to-day events. Change follows change, crisis follows crisis, with such rapidity that earlier events tend to be erased from the memory. Perhaps the best way of illuminating the picture is to take a substantial period of time, comparing the situation at its beginning and at its end. One of the most tempestuous decades in Far Eastern history has been the one now drawing to a close. Let us take this decade and compare the Far East of 1950 with that of 1960.

From the standpoint of the free world the picture is a mixed one, with failures to balance against successes. At the same time—and I should

like to emphasize this point—substantial progress has been made. The Far East is still, in 1960, an area of tension and of serious problems. It is also, incomparably more than in 1950, an area of hope.

Let us recall briefly the situation 10 years ago. The Chinese Communists had just completed the conquest of the mainland and were consolidating their grip over a quarter of mankind. The armies of the Republic of China had been shattered, and their remnants were withdrawn to Taiwan.

Japan was still under military occupation, its industries prostrate, its people totally dependent on outside aid for their very subsistence. A start had been made in physical and mental reconstruction, but no one could yet tell whether the fragile structure of the emerging new Japan would long survive in the harsh climate of postwar Asia.

Elsewhere in the Far East the picture was equally bleak. In Viet-Nam the nationalist movement had seemingly been captured by the Communists.

The Government of the Philippines had entered on the course of freedom and democracy, but its still-unseasoned government was facing a severe trial in combating the Communist-led Hukbalahap rebellion.

In large parts of Burma virtual anarchy prevailed. Scarcely had independence been secured when a brutal act of assassination wiped out much of the leadership upon whom the country depended, including its revered General Aung San. Before their successors could establish themselves in their positions, a series of Communist and other dissident uprisings had virtually destroyed central authority. By 1950 the authority of the Government of Burma extended little beyond the limits of Rangoon.

Indonesia in 1950 was undergoing the difficult process of dismantling a federal structure and attempting to build a unitary state upon the unstable foundations of regional dissidence and an economy severely damaged by 8 years of war, revolution, and Communist violence.

In Malaya a vicious campaign of Communist terrorism was in full sway, bringing fear and disruption and sapping the morale of this rich nation.

In the confused atmosphere of the Far East in 1950 fell the massive shock of the Korean war in June. The future of free Asia looked dim indeed.

This was the Far East a decade ago. The landmarks of the subsequent 10 years are familiar to all of us: the Japanese peace treaty, Panmunjom, Dien Bien Phu, the Manila or SEATO Pact, the Bandung Conference, Quemoy and Matsu Islands, Tibet, and Laos. Some of these events can be counted as advances toward our objectives, others as a step backward. All played their part in shaping the Asia of 1960. By comparing this new Asia, the Asia of 1960, with that of 1950 we can determine its progress over the decade.

I have already mentioned one of the central facts of the past 10 years: the emergence of Communist China as the dominant power of the Asian mainland. To complete the story, however, we should note that the decade has not been one of untrammelled success for that regime. The consolidation of its hold over the Chinese people has produced deep internal resentment and dissatisfaction. It has pushed its borders forward through the destruction of Tibetan autonomy and the creation of a satellite state in north Viet-Nam, as well as by nibbling at the boundaries of Burma and India. But there it has been halted. The Republic of China on Taiwan continues to provide an alternative to Communist domination of the Chinese people. The threatened expansion of Chinese Communist power into the Republic of Viet-Nam and Laos has been averted. Equally significant, the open revelation of Chinese Communist methods and objectives has led to a growing awakening and revulsion on the part of free Asia, a decisive turning away from the regime.

There are also positive achievements of the free world during the decade we are considering. For example, Japan has performed one of the miracles of modern times, rebuilding its shattered economy with a speed and energy unforeseeable in 1950, creating a stable and democratic political environment, and emerging as a mainstay of responsible freedom in Asia, with the greatest industrial concentration and pool of highly skilled labor east of the Urals. In the process it has provided the underdeveloped countries of the world with a graphic and exhilarating example of the fact that rapid economic progress need not involve state controls and totalitarian techniques. The factories of Japan are booming. Its people have entered the threshold of a new level of material welfare and responsible democracy. The lie has

been given in most decisive terms to one of the chief dogmas of communism.

In other countries of the Far East many of the gloomy portents of 1950 have also been confounded.

In Burma there has been a remarkable improvement in security and stability. A number of serious problems remain to be solved, but the contrast between 1950 and 1960 is one of the most striking in Asia.

In the Philippines the Hukbalahap rebellion was resolved by the wise measures of President Magsaysay. The country still faces major problems, primarily of an economic nature. Anyone who has experienced the exuberant, positive attachment to democracy which characterizes the Filipino people, however, can feel a good deal of confidence in their ability to overcome these problems.

In Malaya Communist terrorism has been virtually eliminated. The nation has achieved independence in an atmosphere of prosperity and freedom.

In Viet-Nam the courage of a great leader, President Diem, and the dynamism of the Vietnamese people are overcoming odds which seemed insuperable a few years ago in the creation of this new and vital state.

In Indonesia, which I have come to know more intimately in the last 2 years than the other countries of which I speak, the course of the past decade has encompassed the whole of the country's history as an independent nation. At its inception the new nation faced unique problems of geography and ethnic disunity, seriously exacerbated by the stresses of a long and bitter revolution. We cannot pretend that these difficult problems have yet been solved. Their continuation has led to an increasing strain on the country's economy, which, in turn, has brought forth still more problems. There are, however, firm grounds for hope that the turning point may be approaching, that Indonesia may master its problems and go on to realize the full potential of its rich land and gentle, friendly people. The nation is still seeking to establish its own identity, an identity which will be a reflection not of any external society but of its own soul. Perhaps the greatest achievement of Indonesia during the past decade is that, despite crises which could have demoral-

ized many a more mature state, the nation is still able to pursue its search with vigor.

Need for Continuing Vigilance

This, then, is the Far East in 1960, the base from which we venture into the still-unknown world of the coming decade. If we compare it with the base from which we entered into the decade of the 1950's, I believe we have grounds for satisfaction and cautious optimism. Viewed in a 10-year perspective, the Red tide is ebbing in the Far East. It might not be going too far to say that the much vaunted "wave of the future" has lapped at the shores of Asia and is becoming a wave of the past. The adventures of Communist China in Tibet, Laos, India, and Burma have aroused Asians to a new appreciation of the Communist danger. Communist goals, too, are beginning to be more widely understood. The Communist lure of land to the tiller has turned out to be a tragic myth. Instead, the peasant under the Chinese brand of communism has become an institutionalized factory hand with no family life of his own.

At the same time we must not fall into the deadly trap of complacency. The primary source of the current stresses in the Far East remains Communist China, and the advance it has made in increased power and seeming prestige matches the progress made by the free nations on mainland China's periphery. We must remember that the measurable progress we have made toward achievement of many of our objectives in the Far East has been the result of sustained effort, a continuing responsibility on the part of the American taxpayer, and even the expenditure of American lives. The fact that we *are* making progress should be the signal for not only continuing vigilance but even greater effort to consolidate and expand that progress. The case Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker has made for our aid program in India¹ can be repeated with varying emphasis for every country in Asia.

As I said earlier, Asia is a dynamic world. Only a sustained, dynamic approach to its problems and its potentialities will achieve our objective of a free community of nations, each living in the security of mutual respect and mutual tolerance. And until that objective is achieved, we cannot consider our own nation as secure.

¹ See p. 776.

President Sets Date for Visit to Portugal

White House press release dated April 26

In connection with the previously announced visit of President Eisenhower to Portugal,¹ a date has now been agreed upon. President Eisenhower will arrive at Lisbon on the morning of May 23 and depart on May 24. These dates were selected in the expectation that the summit conference will have ended by that time. Should the conference continue beyond the dates of the President's visit to Portugal, however, President Eisenhower either will return to Paris or, if domestic requirements make this impossible, will request Vice President Nixon to represent the United States for the remainder of the conference.

U.S. Reiterates Policy on Travel of Newsmen to Communist China

Department Statement

Press release 203 dated April 20

A year ago the Department of State, in announcing the extension of the validation of passports of American correspondents to travel to Communist China, stated:²

... the Department has repeatedly made it clear that, if any bona fide Chinese Communist newspaperman should apply for a visa, the Secretary of State is prepared to consider recommending to the Attorney General a waiver under the law so that a visa could be granted. Not one Chinese Communist correspondent has yet filed an application. American law does not permit the Department to do what the Chinese Communists demand, which is to agree in advance to admit an equal number of Chinese Communists, even before their identities are known to us. If the Chinese Communists were indeed interested in reciprocity, they would have an equal number of Chinese newsmen apply for visas.

In the year that has passed the Department:

1. Added two more to the list of the 30 American news organizations authorized to send one representative each to Communist China, bringing the total to 32;
2. Removed from the validation the reference to the Communist-controlled portions of China,

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1960, p. 556.

² BULLETIN of May 11, 1959, p. 673.

which reference several American newsmen had indicated might militate against their receiving a visa to enter Communist China. These passports now have no time limitation other than the periods for which they are normally valid.

In the same year, despite U.S. initiatives:

a. The Chinese Communists have not granted a single visa to an American correspondent to enter Communist China.

b. Not a single Communist Chinese correspondent has filed an application for an American visa to enter the United States.

c. The Chinese Communists have continued to insist that, if there is to be travel of newsmen to each other's countries, an agreement must be announced for this purpose. This agreement must promise "equal and reciprocal treatment."

It should be noted that the United States has never had such an agreement with any other country. Nor has the Peiping regime apparently found it necessary to conclude such an agreement, even with those countries where it has no diplomatic relations and where journalists of its official New China News Agency operate, i.e. France and Cuba. It is obvious that Peiping is seeking to use the issue of news representatives in an effort to force the United States into a formal agreement to improve the prestige of the Chinese Communist regime.

The U.S. position is simply that ample provisions already exist under the law to permit the "equal and reciprocal" travel of newsmen to each country. The fact that the Peiping regime has not yet allowed any of their journalists to apply for a U.S. visa casts substantial doubt on their professed concern for reciprocity. In July 1959 one American news representative was refused a visa on the grounds that it was "not convenient at this time." It is also known that the requests of several reputable free-world journalists other than American have been either turned down or ignored in recent months. Therefore, on the basis of the situation as of today, the Department of State is obliged to conclude that Communist China, despite its statements, has no serious interest at this time in either the travel of its own newsmen to the United States or the travel of American newsmen to the China mainland. The representatives of this Government

will, however, continue to press for a satisfactory solution to this problem with representatives of the Peiping regime whenever the occasion presents itself.

The 32 American news organizations, accredited by the Department on the basis of the established criteria announced on August 22, 1957,³ namely, that they had demonstrated sufficient interest in foreign news coverage to maintain at least one full-time American correspondent overseas and that they wished to be represented in Communist China for 6 months or longer, are the following:

American Broadcasting Company, American Universities Field Service, Associated Press, *Chicago Daily News*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Christian Science Monitor*, Columbia Broadcasting System, Copley Press, Inc., Cowles Magazines, Inc., *Denver Post*, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Fairchild Publications, Inc., McGraw-Hill, Minneapolis *Star & Tribune*, Mutual Broadcasting System, National Broadcasting Company, *National Geographic Magazine*, Newspaper Enterprise Association Service, Inc., New York *Herald Tribune*, New York *Times*, *Newsweek*, North American Newspaper Alliance, *Reader's Digest*, St. Louis *Post-Dispatch*, *Saturday Evening Post*, Scripps-Howard Newspapers, *The Sun* (Baltimore), Time, Inc., United Press International, *U.S. News and World Report*, *Wall Street Journal*, and Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Inc.

Secretary Supports Closer Ties Between U.S. and Japan

Following is a message from Secretary Herter which was read by J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, at the New York Public Library, New York City, on April 27 during that city's ceremony inaugurating its sister-city affiliation with Tokyo.

Press release 220 dated April 27

In this centennial year of United States-Japanese diplomatic relations I am delighted to send my warmest wishes to the Tokyo-New York affiliation ceremony.

I join Mayor [Robert F.] Wagner and the citi-

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1957, p. 420.

zens of New York in offering a hearty welcome to Governor [Ryutaro] Azuma and the distinguished Japanese delegation who are here to represent the citizens of Tokyo.

The ties you are establishing today between the

peoples of these two great cities will serve to bring even closer together the peoples of our two nations and to encourage our efforts to advance and prosper in peace and friendship. In this most important work you have my sincere support.

The Citizen and Foreign Policy

by John W. Hanes, Jr.

Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs¹

Some years ago it might have been thought remarkable that a group of businessmen meeting in convention should have any interest in our foreign affairs. Today it would be remarkable if you did not, for there is no other subject which so intimately affects your lives, your taxes, and the future of your children—or whether they will have a future.

The year 1960 will bring forth ample political debate on every aspect of our foreign policy toward individual countries. I do not, therefore, intend to speak on current affairs. Rather, I would like to try this morning to outline the broad course of our foreign relations in the hope that this may give some sense of perspective.

John Foster Dulles outlined the foundations of our foreign policy as simply as I have ever seen done. He said:²

United States foreign policy is designed to protect and promote the interests of the United States in the international field. It is based upon certain facts and convictions:

(a) That the peoples of the world universally desire the elimination of war and the establishment of a just peace;

(b) That the designs of aggressive Communist imperialism pose a continuous threat to every nation of the free world, including our own;

(c) That the security of this nation can be maintained only by the spiritual, economic, and military strength of the free world, with this nation a powerful partner committed to this purpose;

¹ Address made before the National Association of Hosiery Manufacturers at Miami, Fla., on Apr. 21 (press release 204 dated Apr. 20).

² BULLETIN of June 23, 1953, p. 1035.

(d) That change is the law of life, for nations as well as for men, and that no political, economic, or social system survives unless it proves its continuing worth in the face of ever-changing circumstances;

(e) That the effectiveness of our collective-security measures depends upon the economic advancement of the less developed parts of the free world, which strengthens their purpose and ability to sustain their independence;

(f) That in all international associations and combinations within the free world, of which the United States is a member, it considers all nations, including itself, as equals. The sovereignty of no nation will ever be limited or diminished by any act of the United States.

Perhaps the most significant thing about this list is that only one of the six points refers directly to Communist aggression.

This is important, not because the threat should be minimized but because too many people, when they think about foreign policy, never get beyond that particular point. To do so, however, is to deny the existence of any positive goals for our foreign policy and equally to condemn ourselves to a policy of defense against the initiatives of others. Any such policy would indeed be a sterile and hopeless one.

The Era of Change

In my opinion the most basic point of all is "that change is the law of life, for nations as well as for men, and that no political, economic, or social system survives unless it proves its continuing worth in the face of ever-changing circumstances."

This era, as no other in recorded history, is the era of sudden and basic change. It is true, of course, that there have always been forces of

change. The course of history has been determined by whether such changes could be absorbed, and therefore came peacefully, or whether they demanded more flexibility than the particular society involved was capable of showing, in which case they came violently by war or revolution. This is a historic pattern and is fundamentally not different today. What is different, however, are two factors.

First, never before in history has the state of transportation, communications, and technology been sufficient to permit the forces of change to affect more than a relatively small area of the world at any one time. Today the implications and every effect of the great forces of change are immediately global.

Second, never before in history have there been more than one, or occasionally two, fundamental forces of change operating at any one time to alter the fabric of society. Today there are at least four which I think are clearly identifiable.

Let us then consider these forces of change, for plainly they are the challenge which underlies our foreign policy and, indeed, our national survival. How clearly we understand this challenge will determine whether our country will remain free in peace or whether it will increasingly slip downward toward a position of ultimate encirclement and war or subjugation.

International Communism

The movement of international communism is certainly one of the great forces of change. Within 43 years a small group of violent men, starting in Russia, has seized control of all or major parts of 17 nations, with nearly 1 billion people. As a result, the great central landmass from East Germany to the Pacific became Communist-controlled.

The Soviet military power base and potential for aggression and domination is enormous. All its resources are centrally controlled and used to achieve the original goal of world conquest.

Soviet communism, of course, is no longer a true revolution. Its theory has been destroyed because it was based on the inequities of the industrial revolution as it existed more than a hundred years ago. The fact that capitalism has long since eliminated these evils, and has gone on to provide every element of our society with a full life beyond anything in the experience of

history, has given a proof of error and a contrast which the Communists find intolerable.

The experience of more than 40 years of rulership in Russia has transformed the Communist leaders from revolutionaries into overlords and has given them one of the most monolithic vested interests in history to protect from any new revolution. The combination of these facts with a modern technology has made international communism today the most oppressive reactionary force which the world has ever known.

This does not prevent communism from utilizing the mask of revolution as one of its most effective disguises.

International communism is implacably hostile to the freedom of men everywhere, but this is not universally recognized in unsophisticated countries where there are few standards of comparison or valid grounds for judgment. To many of these countries, the Soviet Union—a country which only 40 years ago was seemingly as backward industrially and economically as they themselves are today—stands as a symbol of the progress which can be made in bringing economic advancement to an underdeveloped country. Whether or not this is true, the terrible price which has been paid for this “progress,” in human lives, in individual dignity and personal freedom, is often unknown; but the technical achievements which the Soviets advertise so loudly are very well known indeed.

In most of these countries highly organized Communist parties work skillfully to exploit the fiction that communism alone shows the quick way to progress and productivity. This illusion makes communism doubly dangerous, for it allows it not only to operate as a force of change in itself but also to seek to incorporate all other forces of change toward its own ends. Its requirements seem simple when stated in words: they are only that all the resources of a society—of which human beings are just another one—be controlled and directed in accordance with a master plan to assure conformity of thought and act and eliminate the discords inherent in a society which gives freedom of choice to the individual.

It is our challenge to demonstrate the fundamental horror of what this means—and that it is neither the only nor the true path to progress.

The New Nationalism

The second great element of change in the world today is the march toward political and economic

freedom of colonial peoples. Since World War II, 24 new nations with a population of 800 million people have achieved political independence. In Africa alone, the single year 1960 may produce as many as 7 new independent states. The United Nations was created in 1945 with 51 member nations. Twenty years later, there will probably be at least 100 independent countries in its assembly, one-third of them African. One billion more people responsible for their own political destiny—but also powerfully affecting ours.

This great force of change, this "new nationalism," is a force which we, of all peoples, should not fear, since its basic motivations are the same as those which brought liberty and nationhood to us. And yet it may hold great potential dangers for us if our leadership and understanding are not sufficient to recognize its implications, to satisfy its legitimate aspirations, and to guide its developing influence into channels consistent with the welfare and peace of the world as a whole, as well as with the prosperity and freedom of the new nations themselves.

The new nationalism is found, of course, primarily in countries which have only just emerged from the colonial rule of the Western World. These countries tend to share certain attitudes. They are suspicious of the former colonial powers; and this suspicion is often generalized into a suspicion of the entire Western World, including the United States. They may be unskilled in conducting their own affairs, but they are fiercely resentful of any implication that they are unable to do so. They are jealously proud of their new independence and often feel that it must be continually demonstrated by actions displeasing or inimical to other states, preferably powerful Western states which are identified with the colonial past.

All these reactions, while understandable, are dangerous—dangerous to us and dangerous to the new nations themselves. For it is at this point that international communism can sometimes tempt the unwary into a seemingly harmless alliance by vigorously supporting the most extreme nationalism. The fatal extent of the political and economic infiltration which the Communists carry out under this cover may only become apparent too late.

It must be a prime objective of American foreign policy that the force and the potential of

the new nationalism should develop in freedom, that the dawn of independence not be merely a brief interval of light between colonialism and the long night of Communist domination.

The March of Science

The third great force of change is, of course, the scientific revolution which we characterize loosely as the "nuclear age." The discoveries of the past 20 years exceed, in their potential impact upon human life, all the developments of all the thousands of preceding years of human history. The implications of the atom alone stagger the imagination—unlimited, unending power for peace that could create a world without want; or unlimitable, all-ending power for war that could produce a world without life.

Science has offered us life and health and old age where formerly was sickness and disease and death. These blessings have come inextricably mixed with the new specter of overpopulation. Every triumph in the laboratory spawns new problems in applying it to the affairs of men; and each one challenges the ability of existing social institutions to meet this ever-quickenning tempo of change.

Our first halting steps into outer space are not less significant for the future. Today it is mechanical satellites and missiles on the fringes of our own world's atmosphere. But I expect that many of us will see the tomorrow when men travel to other worlds than our own. What this will mean, we can sense but dimly. But that its meaning will be one of infinite change we cannot doubt.

The Conflict of Ideas

There is, of course, a fourth great current of change in the world which we must not underestimate simply because it is not new and we are close to it. That is the force of Western democratic thought with its tradition of intellectual and personal liberty. It does not involve intimidation or fear. It holds forth the hope of achieving by peaceful means man's noblest aspiration: the progress under law of the individual toward a fuller life in freedom.

This great force of change has within it just as great a potential dynamic as any of the other three which I have mentioned. And we must recognize this clearly: whether that potential is

to be realized in the world of today is a responsibility of leadership that has been inherited by the United States. And now we have come full circle; for how that responsibility is or is not carried out, is, by definition, United States foreign policy.

I turn now to the major outlines of that policy.

The Organization of Peace

The basic objective of our foreign policy is to safeguard the United States; and the method to which we have undoubtedly devoted our most intensive effort is the creation of a world where peace with justice is firmly established—what might be called the organization of peace.

This takes many forms. The United Nations is, of course, a fundamental structure in building a world society based on law, and therefore support of the United Nations is a basic part of our foreign policy. The United Nations has both strengths and limitations. Our policy recognizes both.

There are also power factors and relationships today, as there always have been, which exist outside any formal structure. The forthcoming summit meeting, and similar negotiations among states which have preceded it over the years, are recognitions of this pragmatic fact.

The purpose of any international mechanism, whether it be called a United Nations or a summit conference or an exchange of ambassadors, is to provide a method whereby countries may understand each other's real needs and motives and goals and work out methods by which these can be reconciled in peace. That, at least, is the traditional use of such mechanisms; and it is still the use which *we* make of them.

We are well aware that communism frequently seeks to use them merely as weapons to achieve world domination. There have been occasions, before this was well understood, when communism has been successful in perverting these peaceful processes to its ends. But we have found that, if our objectives are modest and our methods prudent, we, too, can have successes. We have been able to make self-enforcing agreements with the Communists which have enhanced the prospects of peace and have not furthered the aims of Communist imperialism. Such agreements are not easy to come by, and they must be guaranteed by more than promises. But with patience and

persistence they are possible. Indeed, in the present circumstances of a world haunted by the shadow of nuclear devastation, it is clear why we seek every proper opportunity to explore differences and to find tolerable methods of accommodation, however tedious and frustrating the path.

It is in this spirit, motivated by necessity and perseverance rather than by any naive belief that communism has somehow changed its nature or its goals, that we approach the coming summit negotiations—and the probable succession of negotiations of all types that will follow over coming months and years.

The Evolution of the Alliance

Since we recognize, however, that neither institutions such as the United Nations nor negotiations at the summit can in themselves dependably safeguard the peace or guarantee our own freedom, we must and do build strength elsewhere.

The first place we build is in our own Military Establishment. It will remain an absolute prerequisite to the peace and security of the world, to the preservation of our nation, and to the success of our diplomacy that our military power be second to none.

Our armed strength today, however, is far more than national, and our Military Establishment is charged with a trust for the security of many other nations. It is dependent, in turn, for its effective functioning upon their cooperation.

The means by which we practice this cooperation is our worldwide system of alliances under which the United States has made cooperative defense treaties with 42 other nations.

This system has two great purposes. The first is to set up a political warning system designed to remove the possibility of Communist miscalculation as to our intent and our resolution—miscalculation which has been the cause of so many of the wars of the past.

This worldwide barrier along the periphery of the Communist world precludes the chance that Red armies will conquer the free nations one by one. It has been erected despite enormous difficulties. And it is a very great accomplishment indeed.

Our collective security arrangements are supported and made workable by our Mutual Security Program of military aid. Approximately one-

half of the roughly \$3½ billion that we spend on mutual security each year goes for military hardware and direct military assistance to our allies.

But the system of collective defense that the free nations have built is not just a United States gift to the world. Other nations contribute importantly. They provide bases which greatly increase the effectiveness of our deterrent power. They contribute the bulk of the ground forces—the 12 nations which receive most of our defense support maintain 3 million men under arms. They provide what is most important of all—a courageous will to resist powerful forces which knock threateningly at their very doorstep.

Originally our collective defense arrangements were thought of as purely military alliances. One of the most encouraging developments of our time, however, has been the growth of these alliances, notably NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], into effective means for close political and economic cooperation without abandonment of the sovereignty of the members.

This system we are helping to build is, therefore, no mere temporary expedient. It is a constructive evolution which should persist until such time as an international rule of law can be established that is universal, enforceable, and dependable.

The Economic Dimension

I have spoken so far primarily of our political and military arrangements. They have formed the shield to meet and largely to absorb the shock of overt Communist military and political aggression which has characterized the decade and a half just past. However, these more traditional instruments of foreign policy may *maintain* peace, but they do not by themselves *build* peace in the changing world of today. They do not meet the problems of poverty and hunger and illness that beset three-fourths of the world's population and thereby press upon the stability both of the new nations and of all political institutions.

For these reasons our diplomacy has devised a new dimension of economic assistance.

There are strong moral and humanitarian reasons for these programs which seek to raise hundreds of millions of people above the level of subsistence. Freedom and democracy and individual dignity can hardly be meaningful concepts to a man whose children are starving, or dying of a disease which he knows can be cured.

But there are equally compelling reasons of practicality for our assistance. If the less developed countries should turn to communism in a mistaken effort to speed their development, our own security would be gravely endangered. As parts of a worldwide bloc of political and economic hostility, they could submerge us. Free and prosperous, these same countries represent both a source of vitally needed raw materials for our economy and a limitless potential market for our trade.

One rather rueful indication of the success of our programs is the recent copying of them by the Communists. In the past 6 years the Soviet Union has given \$2½ billion worth of military and economic aid to countries outside the Soviet bloc. This aid has been carefully concentrated in about a dozen politically key countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. These are areas of the world where history and economics have combined to make Soviet aid offers attractive to a degree not well understood by Americans.

Sixty-five countries, with a population of a billion and a half, have an average per capita income of less than \$200 per year. The annual per capita income of the United States is \$2,700. The great mass of humanity who "have not"—once apathetic in its ignorance of any other life—now knows of this great disparity. The fledgling governments in the new lands recognize that they can survive only if they satisfy—and quickly—the explosive demand for a better life which has been kindled everywhere throughout the underdeveloped world. They also know that this means—in addition to their own effort, however great—that they must have capital investment and technical assistance from abroad.

They fully intend to get these things. They will get them wherever and however they can.

These are the economic reasons that communism and nationalism can become dangerously intertwined, and it is the active intent of the Communists that they shall do so. Do not underestimate the resources which Soviet Russia can apply to this economic battle. The gross national product of the Soviet bloc, including Communist China, is about \$400 billion a year, and rising.

However, our own assets, if we use them wisely, are also immense.

We have been hopeful that other peoples might regard with favor and adopt our essential institu-

tions. We have never sought by force or subversion to remold the world in our own image. We have clearly recognized, however, that in this interdependent world the existence of Western institutions is imperiled unless the less developed countries are provided both the knowledge and the incentive to choose some route other than that offered by communism to find economic freedom without sacrificing political liberty and human dignity.

Disarmament

There is one other aspect of United States foreign policy which is very important.

We are not content with a world where militarily we must strain just to preserve a minimum security and where the cost of maintaining a grim arms balance absorbs our best efforts, consumes our substance, and pervasively shadows our future. So we strive for dependable disarmament, meaning reliable measures of international inspection to diminish the danger of massive surprise attack, and actual limitations or reductions of various types of armament.

The Soviet Union for 15 years has frustrated any progress by persistently evading any concrete inspection proposal to verify its compliance with any agreement. We have equally persistently refused to give up our defenses and our security in exchange for a Communist promise.

It is easy to become discouraged about the possibility of ever achieving disarmament, and it is tempting to seek some progress—any progress—by agreeing to just a little less than is safe. But the stakes are too high for us either to stop trying or to start gambling. The failure to find a sound basis for stopping the nuclear arms race may be as sure a way to end the world as agreeing to a wrong way. We dare not be more than reasonable—nor less than hopeful.

The Foundation of Policy

It is plain, then, that our objectives in foreign policy must be very long-range. Furthermore, they must rest on solid foundations.

The most important of these is the understanding and approval of the people of the United States. American foreign policy is directed by the American people in a very real way. The day-to-day aspects of our international relations,

naturally, are not; but over any reasonable period of time, the operation of our political system makes the support or opposition of the American people controlling.

If our people become dispirited or apathetic or complacent or fearful, it will not be long before these attitudes are faithfully—and fatally—reflected in our foreign policy. It thereby becomes essential that the American people clearly understand the true nature of the world they live in and of the enemy they face.

International communism is engaged in total war with us. It is prepared to continue this war for as long as necessary. Communism, with its belief in its own inevitability, has a terrible patience in seeking its designs. It is my belief and fear that we face a greater danger from our own impatience than from hydrogen missiles.

Two facts are starkly simple. Soviet communism will not go away and stop endangering us in the foreseeable future because of *any* action or series of actions which the United States can take alone. And the United States *alone* could not long survive in freedom against a world fallen under Communist domination.

These things being so, the American people must change some basic attitudes. For one thing, we must learn that because something is bad does not necessarily mean that changing it will make it better. The fact that a policy toward a bad situation has resulted in no improvement does not necessarily mean that the policy is wrong or that another policy should replace it. Any change, under some conditions, might only reward our enemies for being steadfast in their refusal to change.

We hear much of flexibility. Flexibility is a very good thing if we define and use it properly. It is a useful ingredient of fishing rods—and of diplomatic tactics. It is a very dangerous ingredient of cornerstones—and of principles.

Let me illustrate these things with two examples.

Berlin has become a symbol of the resolution of all free people, including our own, to resist Communist enslavement with strength and a quiet firmness. The massive efforts which the Communists have made to erase it ever since the time of the Berlin blockade are compelling testimony to its importance. They find Berlin intolerable.

Berlin, therefore, is a "trouble spot." But the fact that this is still true after 15 years of our

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policy toward Berlin is a triumph, not a tragedy. For Berlin will cease to be a "trouble spot" only when it ceases to trouble the Communists by remaining free.

United States policy toward China and the Far East has been much criticized and often misunderstood. The simple fact remains that that policy has stopped the aggression of Red China and provided a shield of firmness behind which the relatively defenseless new nations of the area could develop in freedom. Many of them have populations containing very large percentages of overseas Chinese. Nearly all of them are weak economically and militarily, compared with the colossus of mainland China. They dare frustrate the designs of Communist China on their own independence only because they trust our firmness in opposing any aggression or any accommodation with subversion.

Had the United States during the past decade indicated hesitation by even considering a deal with Red China, as has been the persistent objective of Communist strategy and tactics, the handwriting on the wall would have become very clear indeed to those who live in its very shadow. I am convinced that, had this happened, the political map of Asia would be a vastly different one than it is today.

Let us be very sure, before we agree to any change in such policies just for the sake of change, that we are certain the results will be in the interests of the United States rather than of our enemies, who so unremittingly seek to make us change.

Such constancy of purpose will be possible only if we remain firm in our principles. It is not easy to follow the course of principle in foreign affairs. Indeed, in the infinitely complex decisions which arise from day to day, it is often next to impossible even to identify what is "right" and what is "wrong."

Morality, however, is not like bad-tasting medicine. There is not necessarily a difference between our own interests and the dictates of conscience. On the contrary, one of our distinguished statesmen has concluded that "in doing 'good' we learn we can also do very well; and in seeking to do well, we find we do much good."

This is a simple and lucid way of saying that in a world where survival and success are dependent as much upon the rightness of what we

fight for as whether we win, no policy will serve the United States which does not also serve the cause of a just peace in freedom for all men everywhere.

U.S. Lifts Restrictions on Travel to Hungary

Press release 230 dated April 29

The Department of State announced on April 29 that effective immediately the restrictions hitherto applicable to U.S. passports for travel to and in Hungary will no longer be in force.

The restrictive endorsement regarding Hungary, which now appears in all U.S. passports, will be canceled at such time as the passport is renewed or upon specific request. Such requests, accompanied by the passport, should be directed to the Passport Office, Washington, D.C., or to the Passport Agency located at Boston, New York, Miami, Chicago, New Orleans, Seattle, San Francisco, or Los Angeles; the Passport Representative at Honolulu; or the Chief Executive Officers of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa. Persons abroad should direct requests to the nearest U.S. consular office.

U.S. Deplores Harsh Repression of East German Farmers

*Statement by Lincoln White
Director, Office of News*¹

As you may know from press reports out of Bonn, the Federal Republic [of Germany] issued a white book earlier this week on the forced collectivization of agriculture in East Germany, pointing up that this has been stepped up within the last 2 months with very repressive measures to bring this about.

Now today the Federal Republic formally sent a copy to our Embassy in Bonn, with a covering statement which points out the serious effect this has had upon the farm population in East Germany. This, incidentally, was formally presented

¹ Made to news correspondents on Apr. 29.

to all other missions at Bonn, including the Soviet Union.

Now, although we have not yet received the white book here in the Department, we have had a number of questions on this, based on the brief stories out of Bonn; and we have been following with deep concern the ruthless coercion which has been exerted on East German farmers in recent weeks and which now apparently is to be directed against artisans, traders, and small entrepreneurs. Our reports indicate that the Soviet puppet regime in East Germany has employed brutal methods to rob the independent farmers of their property and the fruits of their labor. These methods have ranged from massive pressure campaigns to naked force and have been so harsh and heartless as to drive many of these people to flight from their homes, physical and mental breakdowns, even in some cases to the taking of their own lives in hopeless desperation.

We have the deepest sympathy for the people of East Germany and join with the free Germans in the Federal Republic in expressing sorrow and indignation over this suppression of basic human rights. We strongly condemn this program of compulsion which highlights once again the denial to the Germans living in the Soviet Zone of the basic right of self-determination and the completely unrepresentative character of the East German regime.

U.S. and Iran Exchange Messages on Earthquake at Lar

White House press release dated April 26

The White House on April 26 made public the following exchange of messages between President Eisenhower and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran.

President Eisenhower to the Shah

APRIL 25, 1960

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY: I was deeply shocked to hear of the terrible tragedy that has befallen the people of Lar and the surrounding villages. I extend on behalf of the American people our profound sympathy to the victims of this unfortunate catastrophe.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Shah to President Eisenhower

APRIL 26, 1960

Deeply touched by your kind message of sympathy for the victims of the Lar earthquake. I hasten to express sincere thanks for the generous help which your Government is extending to us in this disaster.

MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI

U.S. Acts To Improve Relations With Panama in Canal Zone

White House (Augusta, Ga.) press release dated April 19

The President on April 19 approved a nine-point program for improvement of relations between the United States and Panama in reference to operations in the Canal Zone. The program calls for substantial employee benefits including pay increases and improved housing for Panamanian employees, the expansion of the apprentice program to train more Panamanians in skilled trades, and support of legislation to increase the pensions of disabled former employees.

The program also calls for the installation of a new water main to serve the city of Panamá and a reduction in the rate charged for water sold to the Government of Panama for distribution within that country. The President has also directed that jobs in the Canal Zone be continuously reviewed with a view to employing the maximum number of Panamanians.

Nearly all of the items in the program will be made effective immediately.

The complete program includes the following points:

1. A 10 percent increase in the wage-rate schedules of unskilled and semiskilled employees.
2. The Panama Canal Company's apprentice program will be expanded to afford an opportunity to 25 Panamanians each year to begin 3- and 4-year courses leading to qualification as skilled workmen in various trades. This is a marked expansion of opportunity for Panamanians to learn those skills that are useful both in the Canal Zone and in the Republic of Panama. This program, in implementation of assurances given in the treaty, will provide to Panamanians upon graduation access to more positions, the pay rates of which are based on those in the United States.
3. Substandard housing occupied by Panamanian employees in the Canal Zone will be re-

placed by modern construction. Construction of approximately 500 units of modern rental housing is planned. Construction of the first houses in the program will be commenced immediately.

4. The Panama Canal Company will also pursue a course of action leading to the construction of 500 houses in Panama for sale to Panamanians employed in the Canal Zone but living in Panama.

5. The Panama Canal Company will proceed with the construction of a new water main at a cost of \$750,000 to supply the rapidly expanding suburbs of the city of Panamá.

6. The Panama Canal Company will also substantially reduce the rate at which water is sold to the Government of Panama for distribution in the cities of Panamá and Colón.

7. The Panama Canal Company and Canal Zone Government will support legislation now pending in Congress to increase the gratuity paid to employees who previously were not within the Civil Service retirement system and who were terminated because of physical disability.

8. Teachers in the Latin American schools in the Canal Zone will receive a 10 percent pay increase.

9. All agencies in the Canal Zone have been directed by the President to review the list of jobs reserved for citizens of the United States with a view to placing more Panamanians in skilled and supervisory positions.

Chilean Student Leaders Visit United States

The Department of State announced on April 26 (press release 216) that a group of seven university student leaders from Chile was arriving in Washington on that day to begin a 40-day visit to the United States. The students are accompanied by Sidney L. Hemolsky, the director of the Chilean-American Binational Center at Santiago. The group is traveling under the auspices of the cultural exchange program of the Department of State.

The leader of the group is Patricio Fernández, the president of the Chilean Federation of Students. Mr. Fernández wrote a letter to President Eisenhower last February in behalf of the Federation, criticizing U.S. policy in Latin America. The President, who was visiting Chile at the time, acknowledged the letter publicly, and a reply was

sent to the students on April 8, 1960, by American Ambassador Walter Howe.¹ Ambassador Howe invited the leaders of seven Chilean university federations to visit the United States at the time of his reply.

The visit is designed to give the students an opportunity to acquire firsthand knowledge of the people and institutions of the United States and to promote exchanges of views between the visitors and North American students. The visitors will travel to university and college campuses throughout the United States and will have a chance to visit large and small communities.

Their itinerary includes Philadelphia, Pa.; San Francisco and Stanford, Calif.; Albuquerque, N. Mex.; Paris, Ill.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; a return visit to Washington, D.C., May 21-27; New York City; and San Juan, P.R., June 2-15.

The names of the visiting students follow:

Patricio Fernández, president of the Chilean Federation of Students; engineering student at the University of Chile

Fernando Munita, president of the Student Federation of the Catholic University of Santiago; student of agriculture

Daslav Ursic Vesalovic, president of the Student Federation of the State Technical University; chemistry student

Horacio Pávez, president of the Student Federation of the Santa María Technical University of Valparaíso; student of civil construction

Oswaldo Martínez, president of the Student Federation of the Austral University of Valdivia; student of forestry engineering

Alejandro Foxley, president of the Student Federation of the Catholic University of Valparaíso; student of chemical engineering

Bernardino Sanhueza, Christian Democratic delegate to the Student Federation of the University of Concepción

President Sends Greetings on Venezuela Sesquicentennial

White House press release dated April 23

Following is a message sent by President Eisenhower to President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela.

APRIL 18, 1960

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It gives me great pleasure to convey to Your Excellency and to the people of Venezuela warm greetings and hearty congrat-

¹ For texts of the Chilean students' letter and the U.S. reply, see BULLETIN of Apr. 25, 1960, p. 648.

ulations from the people of the United States and from myself on the occasion of the commemoration of the sesqui-centennial of the independence of the Republic of Venezuela. I am confident that the social, political, and economic progress of Venezuela and its people will continue in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

President Congratulates Brazil on Inauguration of New Capital

White House (Augusta, Ga.) press release dated April 21

The White House on April 21 made public the following message from President Eisenhower to President Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil on the occasion of the inauguration of the new capital of Brasilia.

APRIL 20, 1960

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will recall how greatly I was impressed during our meeting at Brasilia last February¹ with the extraordinary accomplishment of the Government and the people of Brazil in building this inspiring new capital. On this joyful occasion of the inauguration of your great city of the future, I wish to renew my congratulations to Your Excellency on your vision and achievement and on the splendid pioneering spirit of Brazil.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Mr. Terman Appointed Member of Board of Foreign Scholarships

The White House announced on March 23 that the President had on that date appointed Frederick Emmons Terman to be a member of the Board of Foreign Scholarships for a term expiring September 22, 1962, vice Charles S. Benson, term expired.

¹ President Eisenhower made a 2-week trip to South America Feb. 22-Mar. 7, 1960, during which he visited Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay; for background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 28, 1960, p. 471.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress 2d Session

- Enabling the United States To Participate in the Resettlement of Certain Refugees. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 397. H. Rept. 1433. March 29, 1960. 14 pp.
- National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union. Report of the Senate Committee on Government Operations made by its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. S. Rept. 1204. March 29, 1960. 70 pp.
- United States Foreign Policy: Economic, Social, and Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and Its Implications for United States Policy. A study prepared at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. No. 12. March 30, 1960. 98 pp. [Committee print]
- Conventions and Recommendation Adopted by the International Labor Conference at its Forty-third Session at Geneva. Letter of transmittal, together with texts of the conventions and recommendation. H. Doc. 365. March 30, 1960. 24 pp.
- Extension of Suspension of Duty on Imports of Casein. Hearing before the Senate Finance Committee. March 31, 1960. 121 pp.
- Study Mission in the Caribbean and Northern South America, November 1959. Report by Senator Homer E. Capehart to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. April 1, 1960. 45 pp. [Committee print]
- Fifteenth Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission of Information. Letter of transmittal, together with text of report. H. Doc. 369. April 4, 1960. 43 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Tax on First Domestic Processing of Coconut and Palm Oil. Report to accompany H.R. 8649. S. Rept. 1233. April 5, 1960. 6 pp.
- Temporary Free Importation of Certain Tanning Extracts. Report to accompany H.R. 9820. S. Rept. 1234. April 5, 1960. 6 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Alumina and Bauxite. Report to accompany H.R. 9307. S. Rept. 1235. April 5, 1960. 8 pp.
- Treaty of Friendship and Commerce Between the United States of America and Pakistan. Message from the President, together with text of the treaty and protocol. S. Ex. F. April 6, 1960. 15 pp.
- Convention of Establishment Between the United States of America and France. Message from the President and text of the convention, together with a protocol and a joint declaration. S. Ex. G. April 6, 1960. 14 pp.
- Mutual Security Act of 1960. Report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 11510, to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. H. Rept. 1464. April 7, 1960. 172 pp.
- Foreign Commerce Study: Latin America—Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, and Haiti. Report of Senator George A. Smathers on a study mission to the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. April 7, 1960. 55 pp. [Committee print]
- Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1961. Report to accompany H.R. 11666. H. Rept. 1467. April 8, 1960. 29 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Istle or Tampico Fiber. Report to accompany H.R. 9861. S. Rept. 1269. April 14, 1960. 2 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Istle or Tampico Fiber. Report to accompany H.R. 9861. S. Rept. 1269. April 14, 1960. 2 pp.
- Suspension of Import Duties on Certain Shoe Lathes and Casein. Report to accompany H.R. 9862. S. Rept. 1270. April 14, 1960. 7 pp.

Central Treaty Organization Holds Eighth Ministerial Meeting

The eighth session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held at Tehran April 28-30. Following are texts of remarks made by Secretary Herter at the opening session on April 28 and the final communique, together with a statement made by Secretary Herter on April 26 upon his departure from Washington and a list of the U.S. observer delegation.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY HERTER

Press release 221 dated April 28

First of all, I wish to associate myself with the remarks of my colleagues concerning the gracious welcome extended by His Majesty the Shah. We also are deeply distressed at the suffering and destruction caused by the earthquake at Lar.

On behalf of the United States observer delegation, I thank you for your warm welcome to Tehran. The gracious hospitality of the Government and people of Iran is proverbial, and once again we are its fortunate beneficiaries. We deeply appreciate the many courtesies and kind consideration shown us by our host, the Government of Iran, and the arrangements which have been made to receive this eighth gathering of the CENTO Ministerial Council. I am personally gratified at this opportunity to continue my association with CENTO and to renew valued friendships with the distinguished delegates assembled here today.

Since we last met in Washington,¹ President Eisenhower has visited Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.² He has charged me with conveying to you his deep appreciation of the warm welcome and hospitality extended during his visits.

I have received a message from the President which he has asked me to read to the Council:

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 26, 1959, p. 581.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 28, 1959, p. 931, and Jan. 11, 1960, p. 46.

To the distinguished delegations assembled in Tehran for the eighth session of the CENTO Ministerial Council, I send my warm regard and that of the people of the United States. I have many happy recollections of my visits to Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.

You may be assured that the American people will follow your forthcoming deliberations with keen interest. We are confident that they will prove fruitful and will add to CENTO's success. I look forward to receiving directly from Secretary of State Herter an account of the CENTO Ministerial Council session upon his return.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

These are days of meetings among friends and allies. The cement of our free-world alliances is mixed in these meetings.

Two weeks ago in Washington I met with the Foreign Ministers of the U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and Canada to concert our views about the coming meeting with the Soviet Premier.³

Last week General de Gaulle came to Washington to review world questions with President Eisenhower and concert further our summit preparations.⁴

Now we meet in Tehran to carry on the important business of this alliance—important “come what may” at the 1960 summit. For free-world ties will be needed to bind us in future years even if, as we dare hope, the struggle for freedom may assume a less dangerous form.

Next we go to Istanbul for further talks with our NATO allies at the foreign-minister level.

At the end of next month, in Washington, SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] meets—another grouping of free nations cooperating to keep the peace.

I find in this concentration of meetings of these collective security organizations a symbolism of the indivisibility of freedom and the free world, a reminder of the need for all of us to cooperate

³ *Ibid.*, May 2, 1960, p. 683.

⁴ See p. 771.

in the making of a world—just, free, peaceful, and prosperous.

We meet today on the eve of the forthcoming summit conference. My Government's willingness to meet with the Soviet leaders at the high level of Chief of State is promoted by its unswerving quest for peace. President Eisenhower has said that he would go anywhere, any time, to further the cause of peace. But to be meaningful, peace must have justice and human dignity as its cornerstones. Only then can mankind devote its creative talents to those constructive pursuits which will benefit all humanity.

Thus, the continued progress of CENTO is of great significance. There is no question of my Government's strong support of CENTO. It will continue—in the interests of the peoples of CENTO and in the interests of world peace.

All of us here today should be deeply conscious of the useful work that CENTO has undertaken. We are confident that the future, through common effort, will add to CENTO's accomplishments. My Government is gratified at the part it has been able to play, in cooperation with its friends, in these accomplishments. I know you will allow us to take a measure of pride in the contributions that U.S. programs of economic, military, and technical assistance, both bilaterally and multilaterally, have been able to make in moving toward our common objectives.

Today CENTO is a strong organization. Its goals are peace and progress. Working together and ably assisted through a competent secretariat and a very able Secretary General, the nations here assembled will continue to stride forward. I am confident that CENTO's next 5 years, like its last 5 years, will bring a further significant increase in its security and strength. The future belongs to the free and the brave.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Eighth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held in Tehran from April 28 to 30, 1960. The delegations from countries participating in this meeting were led by:

- (I) H.E. Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal Prime Minister of Iran
- (II) H.E. Mr. Mansur Qadir Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Pakistan
- (III) H.E. Mr. Fatin Rustu Zorlu Foreign Minister of Turkey

(iv) The Right Honourable Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom

(v) The Honourable Christian A. Herter Secretary of State, United States of America

The Prime Minister of Iran, as host, was in the chair.

A gracious message from His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran was read by the Minister of the Imperial Court declaring the Session open.

The Council noted the recent and forthcoming top-level contacts with the Government of the Soviet Union and had a valuable exchange of views on the purposes and prospects of the Summit Conference. Mr. Herter and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd gave an account of the work being done in preparation for this Conference and an account of the work of the Conferences on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests and on Disarmament. The Council noted these reports with approval and expressed support for the efforts being made to secure the easing of tension.

The Council expressed the hope that the Nuclear Tests Conference would reach a solution providing for the suspension of these tests under adequate international control, and that the Disarmament Conference would also make real progress.

Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Herter made it clear that all these discussions with the Government of the Soviet Union would be conducted by the Western Powers with full regard for the interests of their allies in CENTO and the other regional organizations and within the general framework of the security of the free world. The member countries will be kept informed of such discussions.

The Council agreed that the efforts to ease tension should be genuine and should be expressed not only in words but demonstrated also in deeds. The Council reaffirmed their belief that the free countries of the world must maintain their strength and solidarity, as expressed particularly in the regional organizations to which they belonged. The need for this was clear. For instance, hostile propaganda campaigns were directed from outside the area against particular countries and this was inconsistent with the declared purpose of a *détente*. The Council reaffirmed the admiration expressed in their declaration at the Council Meeting in October 1959 in Washington for the spirit in which the Iranian Nation has shown its resistance to subversive and hostile propaganda.

Participating states reaffirmed their intention to maintain friendly relations with all neighbouring states based on mutual interest and respect. They believe that all questions at issue between them and their neighbours can best be solved by discussion as between equals. It is a matter of deep concern to them that such questions are sometimes used by outside powers as a means of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and increasing international tension and subversion, as for example by the recent Soviet statement on "Pakhtoonistan".

The Council approved and noted with satisfaction the report of the Secretary General.

After adopting the economic report and the annual economic review, the Council emphasized the desirability of proceeding as rapidly as possible with the execution of approved joint projects, especially those in the field of communications and public works and others contributing to the raising of the standard of living in the regional countries of CENTO. The growth of technical cooperation between participating states was noted with satisfaction. Under the auspices of the Economic Committee new areas of technical advance are now being explored and help is being given to the regional countries in surveying and developing their natural resources.

The Council noted from the report of the Military Committee that the Permanent Military Deputies Group have done much useful work in a short time with regard to the problem of the command structure and that their studies on this subject are continuing. Much other valuable work is also being done in coordinating the defensive efforts of the participating countries.

The Council decided to hold their next Session in Ankara beginning February 1, 1961.

MR. HERTER'S DEPARTURE STATEMENT

Press release 214 dated April 25

My journey first takes me to Tehran to attend the meeting of the Council of the Central Treaty Organization. Immediately thereafter, the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries will gather in Istanbul for the regular spring ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. A stop in Athens will precede my return to Washington.

My visit to Iran is a welcome opportunity to renew friendships with the leaders of a country bound by traditional and close ties to the United States. I look forward to meeting with our associates in CENTO. We in the United States attach the greatest importance to the Central Treaty Organization. We strongly support CENTO's steadfast efforts to strengthen the principle of collective security in that vital area of the world and to promote the economic well-being of their peoples.

My visit to Turkey, a staunch friend of the United States and stalwart member of both CENTO and NATO, is also most welcome to me. At the ministerial meeting of the NATO Council we shall, in addition to other subjects, discuss preparations for the meeting of Heads of Government in Paris on May 16.

I much appreciate the invitation of the Greek Government to visit Athens and the courtesy shown by the King and Queen of the Hellenes in agreeing to receive me. Prime Minister Kara-

manlis will also see me for a discussion of subjects of interest to Greece and the United States.

This trip will take me to three of our oldest friends. It is my hope that it will serve to strengthen further the ties which for so many years have bound us in close and intimate friendship.

U.S. OBSERVER DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on April 22 (press release 206) the composition of the U.S. observer delegation to the eighth Ministerial Council meeting of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), held at Tehran April 28-30, 1960.

Secretary Herter headed the delegation as U.S. Observer. Assisting him as Alternate Observers were Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Fletcher Warren, Ambassador to Turkey and U.S. Observer in the Council Deputies.

The senior advisers on the delegation included:

Theodore C. Achilles, Counselor of the Department of State
 Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
 John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
 G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
 Harold Kehm, Department of State
 Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
 Lt. Gen. Elmer J. Rogers, USAF, U.S. Representative, Permanent Military Deputies Group, Ankara
 Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
 Edward T. Wallis, Ambassador to Iran
 Gen. Thomas D. White, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Latin America. Resolutions of the General Assembly on Educational Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories. E/CN.12/AC.45/10/Add. 1. March 18, 1960. 5 pp.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

Statistical Commission. Review of International Statistics. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.3/263. March 21, 1960. 78 pp.

Opportunities for International Co-operation on Behalf of Former Trust Territories and Other Newly Independent States. Note by the Secretary-General. E/3338. March 23, 1960. 6 pp.

International Co-operation on Cartography. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3339. March 25, 1960. 11 pp.

Commission on the Status of Women. Draft Report to the Economic and Social Council on the Fourteenth Session of the Commission on the Status of Women Held in Buenos Aires, Argentina From 28 March to -April 1960. E/CN.6/366. April 4, 1960. 21 pp.

General Review of the Development and Co-ordination of the Economic, Social and Human Rights Programmes and Activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies as a Whole:

Appraisal of the Programme of the World Meteorological Organization, 1959-1964. E/3345. April 3, 1960. 18 pp.

Appraisal of the Programme of the International Labour Organization, 1959-1964. E/3341. April 7, 1960. 38 pp.

Appraisal of the Programmes of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1959-1964. E/3342. April 7, 1960. 84 pp.

Appraisal of the Programme of the World Health Organization, 1959-1964. E/3344. April 7, 1960. 150 pp.

Appraisal of the Programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1959-1964. E/3346. April 7, 1960. 64 pp.

United Nations Children's Fund: Report of the Executive Board. E/3336. April 6, 1960. 102 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. Opens Separate Air Talks With Three Nations

Philippines

Press release 217 dated April 27

U.S. and Philippine aviation delegations opened negotiations at Washington on April 26 to conclude a new air transport agreement. The former agreement¹ terminated on March 3, 1960.

Assistant Secretary Thomas C. Mann welcomed the Philippine delegation on behalf of the Secretary of State and expressed his hope that these negotiations would lead to a new agreement of mutual benefit to both countries. In reply Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo, chairman of the Philippine delegation, also affirmed his belief that a

satisfactory understanding could be reached in an atmosphere of mutual good will.

United Kingdom

Press release 222 dated April 28

The civil aviation discussions between the United States and the United Kingdom which were recessed in Barbados on February 24² resumed at Washington on April 27. During the period since the recess of the Barbados talks, both Governments have been reviewing the progress made at Barbados.

The U.K. delegation is headed by Mrs. Alison Munro, Under Secretary, Ministry of Aviation, and includes representatives of The West Indies headed by W. Andrew Rose, Minister of Communications and Works. The U.S. delegation is headed by Laurence C. Vass, Director, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State. Chan Gurney, Vice Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, will serve as vice chairman of the U.S. delegation.

Mexico

Press release 223 dated April 28

Delegations of the United States and Mexico met at Washington on April 26 to resume discussions regarding the provisional air transport agreement³ that currently governs commercial aviation relations between the two countries. The civil aviation negotiations which took place in the spring of 1959 ended in an agreement to extend the validity of the provisional arrangement until June 30, 1960, and to resume discussions before the date of expiration.

The Mexican delegation is headed by Alberto Acuna Ongay, Director of Civil Aeronautics. The other members are Juan Gallardo, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C., Antonio Francoz Rigalt, Deputy Director of Civil Aeronautics, and José Luis Laris, First Secretary of Embassy, Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C. Edward A. Bolster, Deputy Director of the Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State, is the chairman of the U.S. delegation, which includes Alan Boyd,

¹Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1577 and 1844.

²BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1960, p. 528.

³TIAS 3776 and 4099.

Member, Civil Aeronautics Board, Richard J. O'Melia and Dorothy Thomas of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Francis E. Holladay, Program Coordinator (Air), Department of Commerce, and James J. Ferretti, Gerald W. Russell, and Elizabeth Simmons of the Department of State.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.¹

Notification by United Kingdom of extension to: Bahamas, March 14, 1960.

Law of the Sea

Optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.²

Ratification deposited: Haiti, March 29, 1960.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptances deposited: Turkey (with reservation), March 25, 1958; India (with declaration), January 6, 1959; Poland (with declaration), March 16, 1960.

Sugar

International sugar agreement of 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, March 30, 1960; Haiti, April 6, 1960.

Notification by United Kingdom of extension to: Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, March 21, 1960.

Telecommunications

North American regional broadcasting agreement and final protocol. Signed at Washington November 15, 1950. Entered into force April 19, 1960.

Proclaimed by the President: April 19, 1960.

Trade and Commerce

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.²

Signature: Federal Republic of Germany, March 3, 1960.

Declaration confirming signature deposited: Ghana, March 28, 1960.

Declaration extending standstill provisions of article XVI: 4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957. Entered into force May 11, 1959. TIAS 4345.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Declaration confirming signature deposited: Ghana, March 28, 1960.

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.²

Declaration confirming signature deposited: Ghana, March 28, 1960.

Procès-verbal extending the validity of the declaration extending the standstill provisions of article XVI: 4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force May 11, 1959. TIAS 4345.

Declaration confirming signature deposited: Ghana, March 28, 1960.

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.²

Declaration confirming signature deposited: Ghana, March 28, 1960.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 29, 1959. Entered into force October 9, 1959; for the United States December 19, 1959. TIAS 4384.

Signature (subject to ratification): Brazil, March 15, 1960.

BILATERAL

Denmark

Agreement relating to a weapons production program. Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen April 12, 1960. Entered into force April 12, 1960.

Iceland

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Reykjavik April 6, 1960. Entered into force April 6, 1960.

Mexico

Agreement providing for establishment and operation of a tracking and communications facility in the vicinity of Guaymas, Sonora (Project Mercury). Effected by exchange of notes at México April 12, 1960. Entered into force April 12, 1960.

Pakistan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Karachi April 11, 1960. Entered into force April 11, 1960.

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of November 26, 1958, as supplemented and amended (TIAS 4137, 4257, 4331, 4353, and 4426), with exchange of notes. Signed at Karachi April 11, 1960. Entered into force April 11, 1960.

Uruguay

General agreement for a program of technical cooperation in Uruguay. Signed at Montevideo March 23, 1956. Entered into force: March 22, 1960.

Agreement relating to technical cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo March 14, 1951. Entered into force March 14, 1951, for those provisions not requiring legislative approval.

Terminated: March 22, 1960 (superseded by agreement of March 23, 1956, *supra*).

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Post at Lomé Elevated to Embassy

The Department of State announced on April 27 (press release 219) that the American consulate at Lomé, Togo, was on that date elevated to an Embassy upon the formal attainment of independence by the former U.N. trust territory under French administration. Togo obtained its independence following agreement between the Government of Togo, under Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio, and the French Government, and pursuant to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1416(XIV) of December 18, 1959.

The United States first opened a consulate at Lomé in May 1959. Jesse M. MacKnight has been named Chargé d'Affaires.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Americans on a New Frontier—U.S. Technicians Lend a Hand Abroad. Pub. 6921. Economic Cooperation Series 55. 29 pp. 15¢.

This pamphlet describes the activities of a representative few of these Americans in the less developed areas of the world.

Mutual Security in Action—Cambodia. Pub. 6931. Far Eastern Series 85. 12 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet giving background information on the country and discussing its economy, problems, and the extent of U.S. assistance.

Summary of East-West Trade in 1958—Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, Thirteenth Report to Congress. Pub. 6932. General Foreign Policy Series 147. 51 pp. 25¢.

A report submitted by Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon to Congress for the year 1958.

Mutual Security in Action—Ceylon. Pub. 6936. Near and Middle Eastern Series 47. 12 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet discussing the country, government, economy, and the role of U.S. technical assistance.

Working With People—Examples of U.S. Technical Cooperation. Pub. 6942. Economic Cooperation Series 56. 31 pp. 15¢.

This booklet describes a number of the projects contributing to the economic growth of newly developing countries, creating firmer bonds of friendship between their peoples and ours.

Mutual Security in Action—Brazil. Pub. 6951. Inter-American Series 57. 16 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet discussing the country, government, economy, and problems of Brazil, and the extent of U.S. assistance programs.

The Kingdom of Nepal. Pub. 6953. Near and Middle Eastern Series 48. 13 pp. 15¢.

An illustrated pamphlet reprinted from the *Background* publication entitled "The Subcontinent of South Asia."

Military Mission to Venezuela. TIAS 4381. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Venezuela, amending agreement of August 10, 1951, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Caracas March 31 and April 29, 1959. Entered into force April 29, 1959.

American Military Cemeteries. TIAS 4383. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Belgium. Signed at Brussels November 27, 1959. Entered into force November 27, 1959. With note signed at Brussels December 24, 1959.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 25–May 1

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to April 25 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 203 and 204 of April 20, 206 and 211 of April 22, and 209 of April 23.

No.	Date	Subject
†208	4/25	Trade liberalization.
†212	4/25	Delegation to NATO ministerial meeting (rewrite).
213	4/25	Herter: remarks at luncheon for President de Gaulle.
214	4/25	Herter: departure for CENTO and NATO meetings and visit to Greece.
†215	4/26	Adair: "Reduction of Foreign Import Restrictions."
216	4/26	Chilean student leaders visit U.S. (rewrite).
217	4/27	Air negotiations with the Philippines.
†218	4/27	Exchange of notes with Iran.
219	4/27	Togo consulate raised to embassy.
220	4/27	Herter: message to New York-Tokyo affiliation ceremony.
221	4/28	Herter: opening statement, CENTO meeting.
222	4/28	Air negotiations with U.K.
223	4/28	Air negotiations with Mexico.
*224	4/28	Cultural exchange (Yugoslavia).
*225	4/28	Amendments to program for visit of King and Queen of Nepal.
†226	4/28	Wilcox: "Disarmament: The Problem and the Prospects."
†227	4/29	Wilcox: "World Populations and Economic Development."
*228	4/29	Cultural exchange (Argentina).
†229	4/29	Delegation to World Health Assembly (rewrite).
230	4/29	Lifting of travel restrictions to Hungary.
†231	4/30	Herter: arrival statement, Istanbul.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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TREATIES IN FORCE . . .
January 1, 1960

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between the United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

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